CONFIDENTIAL
-3-
conference for which we had called. Our two major
objectives bringing more pressure to bear on the
Vietnamese and drumming up more resettlement places
might be difficult to reconcile at a single conference.
The UNHCR was concerned to preserve his non-political
role, and a number of potential resettlement countries
would be reluctant to attend a conference if there was
a danger that it would turn into a slanging match.
b) We should try to influence the Vietnamese through ASEAN
and the non-aligned countries. There was still too much
ignorance about Vietnamese behaviour and the scale of the
problem among the non-aligned.
c) Perhaps because of its humanitarian record, Hong Kong was
given a low priority by most resettlement countries. But
they were unlikely to do more for Hong Kong unless we gave
a lead. The United States was the key.
d) We should be under pressure to offer more resettlement
places in the context of a conference.
be difficult politically.
This would, however,
e) We should also need to consider the possibility of providing
money for the UNHCR budget. An extra £1.25 m would be
necessary to maintain our 8.5% share.
f) The Americans were under the impression that there was
a greater degree of Hong Kong involvement in the refugee
racket than was in fact the case, and that the Hong Kong
Government could do more to stop it. The Governor should
put the record straight during his visit to Washington.
CONFIDENTIAL
/5.