CONFIDENTIAL
3.
DSR 11C
role in the "Three Worlds system" on lines prescribed by
the Chinese.
Misunderstanding and conflicts of perception
may thus well persist, and as you made clear much will
depend on the extent to which the new leadership keep to the
paths they have so recently embarked upon.
4.
Nevertheless, the contacts my colleagues and I have
recently had with the Chinese bear out your view that there
is now hope for much improved understanding and scope for
a good measure of practical cooperation. Other Western
countries, notably the United States, Canada and the major
powers of Western Europe have clearly come to the same
conclusion.
So too have the Japanese and a growing number
of countries in S E Asia and the Pacific. We do not want
to be behind anyone else in seizing the opportunities which
the new situation may create for us.
5. We also have to take proper account of Soviet
apprehensions about China. Some kind of reconciliation
in the long term cannot be excluded, and we must watch out
for signs of it; but their antagonism is deep rooted and
seems likely to persist for the foreseeable future.
Soviet strength is at present more than adequate to cope with
any Chinese threat, real or imagined; Russian worries
relate to what China may ultimately become with massive
injections of Western technology. This raises the
delicate question of the form in which the complex
relationship between the West, including the US, China and
the Soviet Union will evolve.
The Chinese may be right to
regard Soviet professions of adherence to détente as a
/subterfuge,
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