BACKGROUND
CONFIDENTIAL
3.
Sino/Soviet Relations
8.
When the Chinese informed the Russians on 3 April that they would not extend the Sino/Soviet Treaty of "friendship, alliance and mutual assistance", they also put forward a proposal
for negotiations on their bilateral relationship.
have since shown a further interest in this.
Both sides
However, there
have been no other signs of any rapprochement, and mutual propaganda attacks continue.
9.
The Chinese leadership's expression of interest in talks
is probably motivated by tactical considerations.
Following
their abrogation of the Sino/Soviet Treaty, they want to project
an impression of reasonableness so as to place the onus for any
problems in state-to-state relations on the Russians; and they
probably also see some advantage in establishing a framework
for the Sino/Soviet relationship, both to promote bilateral
economic and commercial cooperation and as a hedge against further
deterioration eg in the event of more Chinese incursions into
Vietnam.
The Russians have an interest in reducing tension
on the Sino/Soviet border, and will not wish to appear Less
reasonable and accommodating that the Chinese; but they will
have very much in mind the risk of renewed Sino/Vietnamese
hostilities, and Vietnamese expectations of them.
China/Vietnam
10.
There appears to have been no progress in the negotiations between China and Vietnam which began in Hanoi on 18 April, apart
from agreement on an exchange of prisoners. The Chinese
have declined to discuss Vietnam's proposals for a demilitarised zone along the border and have insisted on prior discussions of proposals which in effect Link a solution of border problems to
China's demand for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from
Cambodia and Laos.
No date has been fixed for the resumption
of talks, which will be in Peking.
CONFIDENTIAL
/12.