3. DESCRIBING THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, RAMOS SAID THAT THE STATUS OF MACAO WAS IN FACT THE MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCK FROM THE IR INCEPTION AT THE BEGINNING OF 1977 UNTIL THE COMMUNIQUE WAS ACTUALLY ISSUED IN FEBRUARY THIS YEAR (ALTHOUGHT NEGOTIATIONS IN PARIS AND ELSEWHERE HAD BEEN INTERRUPTED SEVERAL TIMES LARGELY BECAUSE FO PORTUGUESE DOMESTIC POLITICS) THE CHINESE HAD PRESSED HARD FOR AN OPEN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF MACAO'S CHINESE STATUS, BUT IN THE END HAD ACCEPTED FOR AN ORAL ACCEPTANCE THAT IT WAS CHINESE TERRITORY. THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN PREPARED TO GO FURTHER, BUT HAD BEEN AFRAID OF THE OUTCRY AT HOME. SOVEREIGNTY AS SUCH HAD NOT BEEN MENTIONED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. RAMOS SAID THAT THE 1933 CONSTITUTION WAS AMBIGUOUS ON THE STATUS OF MACAO, BUT CONSISTENT WITH THE POSITION REACHED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT, AT THE VERY LEAST, A NEW INTERPRETATION HAD BEEN PLACED ON IT.
4. THE ABOVE ACCOUNT THROWS MORE LIGHT ON THE NEGOTIATIONS AND ON THE CONVERSATION RECORDED IN FCO TELNO 150 TO HONG KONG. EVEN IF THERE IS NOW WRITTEN AGREEMENT ON MACAO'S STATUS, THERE WILL PRESUMABLY BE SOMETHING IN THE MINUTES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.
5. RAMOS SAID THAT IN GENERAL THE CHINESE MFA HAS SO FAR SEEMED TO WISH TO AVOID THE WHOLE TOPIC OF MACAO. (HUANG HUA HAD NOT MENTIONED IT IN HIS INTRODUCTORY MEETING WITH RAMOS.) THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT WANT TO USE THE IR NEW EMBASSY AS A LINE OF COMMUNICATION ON MACAO, AND HE WAS FEELING HIS WAY. I REPEATED THAT WE FOUND IT BEST TO THINK WELL ON WHETHER AND HOW TO APPROACH THE CHINESE ON A PARTICULAR HONG KONG ISSUE. ALTHOUGH OUR POSITIONS ON THE STATUS OF OUR TERRITORIES MIGHT DIFFER, SIMILAR CONSIDERATIONS SEEMED TO APPLY TO BOTH.
TES
FED PSE PASS TO POLITICAL ADVISOR HONG KONG BY BAG.
TIMOTHY GEORGE
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}