i
(a)
(b)
(c)
(a)
CURT IDENTIND
course
MAJAN MAL
each party pays all the costs of those NSS (including installation, maintenance and data transmission) which it seeks on the territory
of others. This cod would be the most
favourable to the UK. We could argue that we were not seeking a British quota of NSS in the Soviet Union, where our requirements would be met by the US quota (the cost of which, as the Americans have assured us, will be borne by them); and that if the Russians feel the need for NSS on British territory, it is fair that they should pay. However the Russians could be expected to resist this approach strongly on the grounds that it would discriminate financially against them;
each side pays all costs for NSS on its own territory. If the UK agreed to accept an equal number of NSS, as the Russians have demanded, this course would be unfavourable to the UK since the cost of installing- them on widely scattered and sometimes inaccesible islands would greatly exceed that of installation on the US or Soviet mainland. The case for this kind of cost sharing is that conceptually NSS are nationally owned and operated - a condition on which the Soviet Union insisted when accepting the principle of NSS. An objection is that the quality of NSS
the should not even in theory be open to financial constraints of the "host" country;
each side pays one third of the total cost of all NSS. It might seem natural for the Soviet Union to seek to extend its principle of "equal obligations" to the division of costs. But the Russians might be chary of having to pay a share of costs they could not control and it would be difficult to apply this principle equitably and with confidence, because of the
great disparity between the costs of civil engineering operations, staff and other things between the Soviet Union and the West; as for (b), but with US financial help to UK. It seems quite likely that the US will provide the equipment for all the NSS installed under
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