•
(b)
(c)
CONFIDENTIAL
DSK TIC
respond by undertaking to consider our
proposal on condition that the US reduced
correspondingly its demands for NSS in the
Soviet Union. We believe that a reduced
requirement of say 6 NSS in the Soviet Union would be technically acceptable for a 3 year treaty so long as the right to enlarge the system in the event of a test ban lasting more than 3 years was established by the current SVA. We should need to discuss this approach. with the Americans, since a lower number of NSS in the USSR could affect the prospects of US ratification of the CTB. Unless all 3 parties were prepared to settle on a lower number, a UK offer of less than 10 NSS would not meet the
apparent Soviet political requirement of
"equal obligations". The negotiations would probably then stall on this point and the UK would come under increasing pressure from the US to increase its offer in order to allow the negotiations to proceed;
to say that we will accept an "obligation" in the SVA for 10 NSS but cannot at present identify technically suitable locations for
more than a certain number and will continue
to review the question of where the others
might eventually be sited. The considerations are similar to those at (a) above. In
particular, the Russians would probably ask for
equal treatment, i.e. delay in the selection of sites for some of the 10 NSS in the Sovet Union. But presentationally this option, since it does not rule out "equal obligations" • might be more palatable to the Russians than (a);
offering 10 NSS. The analysis in Annex A of possible locations for NSS suggests (subject to consultations with Governors and, eventually, the consent of the local governments concerned, as well as to US and Soviet agreement) that we could offer 10 NSS without unacceptable political or security considerations but at considerable effort Although, with the exception of Eskdalemuir
and cort
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