challenge principle, so that a party will be able to turn down a request. But it will be understood that refusal of properly substantiated request for an OSI would be a šėrious political act.
3.
This right to request an OSI will be available to all parties to the treaty and the detailed arrangements for an inspection will be agreed on an ad hoc basis after any suspected violation of the treaty has taken place. However, in the case of OSI between the UK, the US and the Soviet Union, we need more precise arrangements. These are being negotiated in advance, as part of a tripartite "Separate Verification Agreement" which will come into force at the same time as the treaty.
4.
If we agreed to an OSI requested by the Soviet Union on UK territory it could involve a visit by a team of about 30 Soviet personnel for up to 30 days to inspect an area of up to 20 square kilometres. The team would be accompanied throughout by UK personnel, so that their activities could be closely monitored. Any installations which are particularly sensitive for security reasons could be excluded from the inspection, provision for access to private property would probably be needed. The Soviet team would be granted immunity, similar to diplomatic immunity, and could import specified inspection equipment such as cameras and metal detectors. There could be an obligation on us to provide detailed maps and earth samples.
5.
but
In practise, it is very unlikely that there will ever be an OSI on British territory: the UK will not conduct nuclear tests while a CTB treaty is in force and earthquakes (which could be mistaken for nuclear explosions) are extremely rare on UK territory. Nevertheless we need to be in a
position to accept requests for OSI in accordance with the CTB treaty.
ACTION
We should welcome your comments on the following points, if possible by the end of February:
(a)
do you foresee any particular difficulty in providing for the
"
Y
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