CODE 18 - 77
Part
Mr Stewart
Mr Thompson
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CONFIDENTIAL
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Reference 4 38.2 12 (54
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THE ROYAL HONG KONG POLICE FORCE
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10 MARTYRS
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1. I was able to discuss recent developments and .the current situation in the police not only with the Governor, .the Political Adviser, the ICAC Commissioner and with some of the police themselves, but also with practically everybody else I met, official and unofficial. Everybody had their pet theories about what should have been done and about what should be done now!
2.
One of the most interesting bits of information came from the young RAF officer who escorted me on my tour of the border, a Squadron Leader Morgan. He was secretary of the Governor's security committee at the time of the crucial meeting on 5 November. It would obviously have been improper for me to have questioned him in detail about what transpired, but in the course of the afternoon he volunteered quite a lot of information which largely confirmed the Governor's own account (which we had previously suspected of contain- ing a certain amount of retrospective self justification). committee were faced with a crisis that appeared to be rapidly escalating and there was an obvious need to take rapid action that would stop the escalation. A concession had to be made and it had to be one that went far enough to avoid the risk of being followed by irresistible demands for further concessions. There is no way of knowing whether the Governor need have gone as far as he did, but at least there is no denying that he went far enough.
The
3: Of course, a lot of people told me that any sort of amnesty was wrong and ought never to have been granted (though not one of those who said this could give a convincing description of what else might have been done in the situation facing the Governor on the afternoon of 5 November - most of their scenarios involved taking wiser actions in the weeks leading up to that date). The most forthright comment on this attitude came from Mr Jack Cater, who told me that he had no patience with these people with 20/20 hindsight and that he thought that the Governor had had absolutely no alternative to acting as he did.
4.
There is still a lot of uncertainty about what is to happen over the policy. Several people told me that they thought that ICAC could
•now be written off and that corruption would gradually creep back to where it had been before. This is certainly not the impression either ICAC themselves or the Governor give, but it shows the need for a firm public demonstration of the Government's determination. The key to this is undoubtedly the Yaumatei case. The Attorney General apparently now hopes to bring charges against about three groups of ten or so people, but the delay in doing so is one of the greatest sources of doubt about the Government's resoluteness. Partly the delay is being caused by the obstructive attitude being adopted by the 105 interdicted men from the Yaumatei station - the Government inspired a front page article in the South China Morning Post on 4 March making this plain.
This,
5. Even if all goes as well as can be expected, it is likely to be a year or so before the Yaumatei cases are concluded. according to Sir Denys Roberts, creates a problem over dealing with
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CONFIDENTIAL