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6. The choice really therefore is all or nothing: Ministers will need to decide whether to go ahead with the whole scheme as set out in the Green Paper or postpone it in deference to Hong Kong's objections (supported by a few other objections from such places as Gibraltar, though these do not have any- thing like the force of Hong Kong's). A decision on this will not need to be taken until the time comes to draft a White Paper, but we must face the fact that it is highly unlikely that they will decide to defer to Hong Kong's objections. Although Ministers are not irrevocably committed to the intro- duction of the proposals in the Green Paper, they have made it amply apparent that they do attach importance to making our immigration rules consistent with our citizenship laws. Mr Smedley explained that the Secretary of State'himself had an interest in this because of his concern that the UK should ratify Protocol 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights (guaranteeing freedom of movement: the importance of this in the context of the Helsinki Agreement is self-evident). Among other things this protocol makes it illegal for any country to refuse admission to its own "nationals". Before we can ratify this protocol it is important that our citizen- ship laws should be clarified to remove any ambiguity about whom we are or are not obliged to accept.
7. When I retured from the meeting, I discussed the outcome with you.
You agreed that we should probably have to accept that the changes would have to be made notwithstanding Hong Kong's objections. There would therefore need to be a skilful public relations exercise to reassure Hong Kong opinion that the changes did not signify any lessening of Britain's commitment to Hong Kong. Mostly this will be a task for the Hong Kong Government, but an important contribution will have to be made from here either by including a suitably worded paragraph in the White Paper itself, or else by issuing a Government statement (eg an inspired PQ) at the time the White Paper is published.
8.
We also discussed the form the reply to the Hong Kong despatch should take. Although we are obviously not in a position to give a detailed reply at this stage, it would be disingenuous simply to say that Hong Kong's views had been noted and would be taken into account. We should at least give some indication of the difficulty that Ministers would find in meeting Hong Kong's objections. We can consider this further after discussing the question with the Hong Kong Secretary for Security on 12 September. Both Mr Smedley and Mr Lee said they would be happy to discuss the question with Mr Davies if he wanted to see them, though in fact there would be little they could add to what we could tell them following last Friday's discussion.
29 August 1978
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W. E. Chantill
W Quantrill
Hong Kong & General Department
Mr Smedley, Nationality & Treaty Dept Mr Jones, Migration & Visa Dept Mr W M Lee, B4 Division General
Home Office
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