THE UNHCR INVITATION TO BE PRESENT AT GENEVA. NEVERTHE- LESS, WE BELIEVE THE SUBJECT OF A MORE REGULARIZED REFUGEE
XODUS SHOULD BE EXPLORED AT GENEVA, EITHER AS A FORMAL AGENDA ITEM OR INFORMALLY. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT GOVERN- .MENTS WITH REPRESENTATION IN HANOI SHOULD URGE THE SRV TO
PARTICIPATE, EVEN IF IT IS OSTENSIBLY FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF DISCUSSING CAMBODIAN REFUGEES IN VIETNAM (WHOM THE UNHCR IS ASSISTING IN CAMPS IN THE SRV). WE DO NOT WISH A CONFRONTATION ON THIS ISSUE, NOR TO ENCOURAGE THE SRV TO SLAM THE DOOR ON SUCH DEPARTURES. WE DO BELIEVE AN INTER- NATIONAL SOLUTION WOULD BE FACILITATED IF THE SRV COULD SEEK SERIOUSLY WITH UNHCR A MEANS OF REGULARIZING THE OUT- FLOW, WHETHER THROUGH FAMILY REUNIFICATIONS OR SOME OTHER MEANS.
9.
THERE ARE PROBABLY ABOUT 175,000 INDOCHINESE REFUGEES IN CAMPS IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, ALL BUT A FEW THOUSAND IN THE CAMPS OF MALAYSIA AND THAILAND. THERE ARE
ABOUT 120,000 REFUGEES IN THAILAND, MOSTLY LAND REFUGEES FROM LAOS AND CAMBODIA, IN 13 MAJOR CAMPS AND SEVERAL MORE SMALLER ONES. IN MALAYSIA, OVER 40,000 BOAT REFUGEES ARE IN SEVEN MAJOR CAMPS, AS WELL AS SEVERAL MORE SMALLER ONES. THE LARGEST MALAYSIAN CAMP IS PULAU BIDONG, AN UNINHABITED ISLAND SIX MONTHS AGO NOW HOLDING ABOUT 20,000 REFUGEES. INDONESIA HAS TWO MAJOR CAMPS, THE PHILIPPINES, JAPAN, AND THE ROC EACH HAVE ONE PRINCIPAL CAMP. SINGAPORE AND HONG KONG (AND MACAU) DO NOT MAINTAIN CAMPS AS SUCH BUT PLACE REFUGEES IN HOSTELS, HOTELS, ETC. THE HONG KONG/MACAU REFUGEE POPULATION IS NOW OVER 5,000. IT IS ESSENTIAL TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THE HUMANITARIAN POLICIES OF GRANTING ASYLUM IN THE COUNTRIES NEAR INDO- CHINA THAT WE STOP THE INCREASE IN THEIR .ALREADY EXCESSIVE CAMP POPULATIONS. THE MOST PRACTICAL SOLUTION WOULD BE A SYSTEM OF NEW ISLAND CAMPS, UNDER UNHCR AUSPICES CAPABLE OF HOLDING ADDITIONAL REFUGEES IN A CAMP SYSTEM WHERE SACH WOULD HAVE TO WAIT HIS TURN FOR RESETTLEMENT. THE CAMP WOULD BE EQUIPPED AND RUN BY THE UNHCR WHICH WOULD ALSO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR WORKING OUT WITH FIRST ASYLUM COUNTRIES A MEANS OF SHARING THE LOAD BETWEEN NEW AND PRESENT CAMPS SO THAT BOATS ARE NOT AUTOMATICALLY PUSHED AWAY AT THE PER IL OF THE REFUGEES AND FORCED TO SAIL TO NEW PLACES OF ASYLUM, SE AWORTHY OR NOT. THE UNHCR SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO SEEK SUCH A CAMP ACTIVELY, INCLUDING THE NECESSARY PLEDGES OF FINANCE AND OTHER ASSISTANCE. THE ASEAN STATES, PARTICULARLY THAILAND AND MALAYSIA, SHOULD BE PREVAILED UPON TO BE AS ACTIVE AND PERSUASIVE AS POSSIBLE AT GENEVA IN SEEKING SUCH A SOLUTION SINCE IT WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF ALL THE ASEAN COUNTRIES TO HAVE SUCH A FACILITY ESTABLISHED. THE BEST LOCATION WOULD SEEM TO BE AN ISLAND OR ISLANDS OFF SINGAPORE, THE PHILIPPINES OR INDONESIA.
10. IT IS IMPORTANT TO KEEP RESETTLEMENT AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT CLOSELY LINKED IN THE EYES OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN ORDER TO GET COUNTRIES UNABLE TO UNDERTAKE MORE RESETTLE- MENT TO INCREASE THEIR FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS AS AN OFF- SET. BOTH RESETTLEMENT AND FUNDING SHOULD BE DISCUSSED INITIALLY IN TERMS OF ANNUAL QUOTAS OR TARGETS ON WHICH THE UNHCR COULD RELY WHILE THE INDOCHINESE REFUGEE PROBLEM CONTINUES. WHERE EXCEPTIONAL OFFERS OF RESETTLE- MENT HAVE BEEN MADE IN SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, E.G., CANADA'S OFFER TO TAKE 600 OF THE HAI HONG REFUGEES, NORWAY'S PLEDGE TO ACCEPT THO SE PICKED UP BY ITS SHIPS, AND LOWER SAXONY'S OFFER TO TAKE 1 1,000 BOAT REFUGEES, WE SHOULD PRESS THE GOVERNMENT TO INCURPURATE THAT NUMBER IN AN ANNUAL QUOTA ON THE VALID ASSUMPTION THAT THE SAME THING IS LIKELY TO HAPPEN AGAIN. COUNTRIES LIKE DENMARK
CONFIDENTIAL