5. AFTER THREE-AND-A-HALF YEARS OF AD HOC COPING, THE PROSPECT THAT THE EXODUS WILL CONTINUE AND OVER THE NEAR TERM MAY INCREASE EVEN BEYOND PRESENT LEVELS CALLS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF MECHANISMS SUITED TO CONTINUOUS EFFORT. HIGH COMMISSIONER HARTLING, RECOGNIZING THAT, HAS INDICATED THAT HE INTENDS TO MAKE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ANNUAL QUOTAS OR TARGETS, FOR RESETTLEMENT AND SPECIFIC PLEDGES OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT A PRIME AIM OF THE CONSUL- TATION, WHICH HE WILL CHAIR. SETTING SUCH TARGETS, WILL BE AMONG OUR OWN PRIME OBJECTIVES AS WELL, NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT IS THE MOST REALISTIC WAY TO SUPPORT THE REFUGEE EFFORT BUT ALSO BECAUSE WE MUST BE ABLE TO DEMON- STRATE TO CONGRESS THAT REFUGEE PROGRAM SUPPORT HAS BEEN INTERNATIONALIZED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE IF WE ARE TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN SEEKING PERMANENT REFUGEE LEGISLATION AND THE CONCOMMIIANT RESETTLEMENT MEASURES AND ADEQUATE FUNDING FOR OUR OWN REFUGEE OPERATION AND OUR CONTRIBU- TIONS TO THE UNHCR.
6. DURING THE YEARS 1975-78, THE U.S. TOOK OR IS PROCESS- ING SOME 200,000 INDOCHINESE REFUGEES FOR PERMANENT RESETTLEMENT. THE GREAT MAJORITY OF REFUGEES LEFT TO AVO ID PER SECUTION BECAUSE OF PAST ASSOCIATION WITH THE USG OR FORMER INDIGENOUS GOVERNMENTS WHICH WE SUPPORTED. HOWEVER, IN THE PAST YEAR THE EXODUS FROM VIEINAM, NO LESS THAN FROM LAOS AND CAMBODIA HAS CHANGED IN NATURE. IT NOW STEMS FROM INTOLERABLE PRESSURES BY THE REGIME ON THE LIVELIHOOD AND EVEN THE RIGHT TO EXISTENCE OF THOSE CLASSES OF INDIVIDUALS DEEMED SUPERFLUOUS TO THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PROGRAMS OF THE STATE. THE PROSPECTS OF BEING FORE CLOSED FROM EARNING A LIVING OR PRACTICING A PRO - FESSION, BEING FORCED TO MOVE TO THE VERY HARSH C?NDITIONS OF THE NEW ECONOMIC ZONES DESCRIBED BY THE MEDIA AS THE VIETNAMESE GULAS -- OR BEING CONSCRIPTED INTO THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES OR WORSE (PARTICULARLY IN KAMPU- CHEA) HAS IMPELLED TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE TO
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RELINQUISH ALL THEY OWN AND UNDERTAKE INCREDIBLY HAZARDOUS VOYAGES. THUS IT IS NO LONGER DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE WAR AND OF SPECIAL RELEVANCE TO THE U.S. BUT HAS BECOME A PROBLEM OF GENERAL INTERNATIONAL CONCERN.
7. IT IS INCREASINGLY CLEAR IN A GREAT MANY CASES THAT REFUGEES ARE ABLE TO BUY THEIR WAY OUT OF VIETNAM, EITHER TO ENABLE FLIGHT ON A SMALL BOAT OR, BY ARRANGEMENT WITH THE AUTHORITIES, TO OBTAIN PASSAGE ON A LARGER CRAFT, OF WHICH WE HAVE KNOWN TWO SO FAR, SOUTHERN CROSS AND HAI HONG. WE CANNOT SAY WITH AUTHORITY THAT THE GSRV DIRECTLY PROFITS FROM THIS ARRANGED EXODUS OR THAT IT IS AN EXPLICIT SRV POLICY TO RID THE COUNTRY OF UNWANTED ELEMENTS. IT IS BEYOND DISPUTE, HOWEVER, THAT LOCAL VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS HAVE RECEIVED LARGE AND SYSTEMATIC BRIBES FROM ESCAPEES AND HAVE ACTIVELY ORGANIZED MASS DEPARTURES. AT THE SAME TIME, OTHER REFUGEES CONTINUE TO FLEE THE SRV AGAINST THE WISHES OF THE AUTHORITIES. IN THE VIEW OF THE UNHCR, ALL ARE REFUGEES WHO DESERVE THE RIGHT OF ASYLUM, GIVEN WHAT THEY FACE AT HOME. WE SUPPORT THIS POSITION, AS DO MOST GOVERNMENTS.
8. THE DRASTIC INCREASE IN ESCAPEES FROM VIETNAM HAS CREATED SERIOUS POLITICAL CONCERN IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES, NOTABLY MALAYSIA, THAILAND, INDONESIA AND AUSTRALIA. THE UNHCH HAS BROACHED WITH THE SRV THE POSSIBILITY OF A REGULARIZED PROGRAM OF EMIGRATION, PERHAPS BUILT AROUND FAMILY REUNIFICATION, BUT HAS AS YET HAD NO MEANINGFUL RESPONSE. OTHER GOVERNMENTS HAVE APPROACHED THE SRV DIRECTLY ON THIS ISSUE, ALSO WITHOUT APPARENT EFFECT. LATEST REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE SRV DECLINED
CONFIDENTIAL