CONFIDENTIAL
iii)
iv)
vi)
The Japanese Government would not demand that CAL change its name or insignia against its will, but would, on a separate occasion, clear
make
its understanding of the character of that name and insignia. When referring to CAL, the Japanese authorities would use the phrase "China Air Lines (Taiwan)".
CAAC would use Narita International Airport and CAL would use Haneda Airport. Uniti Narita opened, both airlines would use Haneda on a temporary basis but with the necessary adjustments of timing made.
CAL aircraft using Osaka Airport would be moved to another airport.
CAL ground services in Japan such as offices and administrative facilities would be entrusted to
agents.
14. The LDP Executive Committee gave its approval to the six-point draft on 9 February, 1974; and on 21 March a Japanese delegation left for Peking for the concluding round of negotiations. The agreement was signed on 20 April, with Mr Ohira making a statement on the political aspects as promised at clause (iii) of the six points. He described the air agreement between Japan and China as a governmental one and flights between Japan and Taiwan as regional air traffic. The Japanese Government did not recognise the emblem on the Taiwan aircraft as a national flag nor did it recognise CAL (Taiwan) as an air firm representing a State (Kyodo news agency, 20 April, 1974).
15. The Chinese side made no formal acceptance of the six points, though it did convey its understanding of Japanese government policy as set out in these points, and would presumably regard any derogation on any of the points as hostile to the ASA. It is perhaps misleading to speak of Chinese demands in the ASA negotiations. The impression is rather that the Chinese made a broad statement of the problems involved and indicated points of concern to them which they hoped to see settled, than that they drew up a list of specific demands. To quote a Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs official speaking on Mr Ohira's visit in January 1974 to China:-
"Their whole approach to the ASA problem had been not only to restate their well-known principles, but to leave it to Mr Ohira's conscience to decide what
Japan should do."
(Tokyo Tel.no. 42 of 10 January, 1974).
On their side, the Japanese were at pains not to issue a text of Mr Ohira's statement to the press after the signing of the ` ASA, partly, perhaps, to avoid the appearance of any formal agreement with Peking on the content of their relationship with Taiwan.
/Political issues
CONFIDENTIAL