CONFIDENTIAL
SO FAR GIVEN BRUNEI IS THAT MAY 1975 DEAL WITH SINGAPORE REFLECTED
REALITIES OF SITUATION AT THAT TIME AND WAS STRUCK WITH FULL CONCURRENCE OF BRUNEI GOVERNMENT AND AIRLINE REPRESENTATIVES AT NEGOTIATIONS. THE 1975 REALITY WAS THAT WE DID NOT WANT FULL SCALE UK/SINGAPORE SHOWDOWN, AND SINGAPORE WAS UNWILLING TO GIVE BRUNEI ANYTHING UNLESS (A) BA SURRENDERED TRAFFIC RIGHTS ON SINGAPORE/BRUNEI SECTOR OF ITS ONCE-WEEKLY TRUNK SERVICE THROUGH
SINGAPORE, AND (B) SINGAPORE OBTAINED ON ITS NEW BRUNEI ROUTE AT LEAST THOSE POINTS BEYOND BRUNEI WHICH IT HAD HELD UNDER OLD SINGAPORE ROUTE 2 PLUS MINOR ADDITIONS. RBA MIGHT NOW ARGUE THAT
1975 CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGED IN THAT SEPARATE UK-FOR-BRUNEI/SINGAPORE ASA HAS BEEN IN EFFECTIVE EXISTENCE FOR THREE YEARS (AND SINGAPOREANS ARE UNLIKELY TO BACKTRACK ON THAT CONCEPT) WHILE UK'S OVERALL BARGAINING STRENGTH VIS-A-VIS SINGAPORE HAS INCREASED TO POINT WHERE SINGAPORE COULD HARDLY THREATEN ANY UK RIGHTS SIMPLY BECAUSE BRUNEI NOW DECIDED TO THREATEN SINGAPORE'S 5TH FREEDOM RIGHTS AT BRUNEI IN CIRCUMSTANCES
WHERE SINGAPORE STILL REFUSED BRUNEI ANY 5TH FREEDOM RIGHTS AT SINGAPORE. ONLY BALANCING FACTOR WHICH MIGHT DISSUADE RBA FROM PRESSING IN SINGAPORE CONTEXT WOULD BE POSSIBILITY (WHICH I FRANKLY THINK REMOTE THOUGH I COULD USE POINT IN ARGUMENT WITH RBA) THAT UNDER SUCH PRESSURE SINGAPORE MIGHT REFUSE FORMALLY CONFIRM INITIALLED BRUNEI/SINGAPORE ASA.
4.
IN SUMMARY SINCE I BELIEVE RBA MUST RECOGNISE THAT THERE IS NO HOPE OF GETTING 5TH FREEDOM RIGHTS FROM MALAYSIANS, I SUSPECT THEIR AMBITIONS WILL BOIL DOWN TO ATTEMPT TO GET 5TH FREEDOM RIGHTS FROM SINGAPORE AND THAILAND IN RESPECT OF ROUTE BRUNEI- SINGAPORE THAILAND, EVEN THOUGH THIS MAY DELAY FORMAL CONFIRMATION OF 1975 ASA WITH SINGAPORE. MY BELIEF REMAINS THAT THAILAND WILL WRECK EVEN THAT LIMITED AMBITION BUT I DO NOT THINK WE CANDO LESS ON BRUNEI'S BEHALF THAN BE PREPARED TO MAKE ATTEMPT IF BRUNEI INSISTS. DO YOU AGREE ?
MACLEHOSE
ALLOT DIST:
MAED
HK YG D
2.
CONFIDENTIAL