CONFIDENTIAL
GR 565
CYPHER CAT A
FM BCARFE HONG KONG 190240Z
CONFIDENTIAL
HKK184/1
RECEIVED MELY NO. 51
20 OCT 1978
DECK OFFICER
PA
PEGISTRY Action Taken
INDEX
TO IMMEDIATE DOT TELNO ALLOT 26 OF 19 OCTOBER 1978
INFO PRIORITY BRUNEI.
FOR STABLES FROM WILSON.
Ne
YOUR ALLOT 152.
1591
1. MANY THANKS FOR YOUR VERY HELPFUL CLARIFICATIONS.
2. I ANTICIPATE MAIN DIFFICULTY WITH RBA WILL ARISE FROM THEIR INTEREST IN 5TH FREEDOM RIGHTS TO THAILAND AND SINGAPORE. IN
THAI CASE I BELIEVE THAIS WILL BE UNWILLING TO CONCEDE OR EXCHANGE
ANY 5TH FREEDOM RIGHTS IN ABSENCE OF ANY REAL THAI INTEREST EVEN
IN 3RD/4TH RIGHTS. SINCE BRUNIANS WILL THUS LACK ANY BARGAINING
POWER IT SHOULD NOT BE TOO DIFFICULT IN ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS TO LIMIT ENVISAGED EXCHANGE TO 3RD/4TH RIGHTS ONLY. HOWEVER I CANNOT
SEE ON WHAT GROUNDS RELATED TO THEIR OWN INTEREST BRUNEI OR RBA
COULD BE DISSUADED FROM ASKING US (AS THEIR AGENTS) AT LEAST TO
ATTEMPT GETTING 5TH FREEDOM RIGHTS FOR RBA. PAST EXPERIENCE
SUGGESTS THAT RBA WOULD DISREGARD ANY WARNINGS THAT BY ASKING THAIS
FOR TOO MUCH THEY MIGHT HARDEN THAI ATTITUDE AGAINST THEM. SINCE WE SHALL BE SIMULTANEOUSLY SEEKING BRUNEIAN GENEROSITY IN RESPECT
OF BA SERVICES TO AND BEYOND BRUNEI, IT COULD BE DANGEROUS TO BE
SEEN BY BRUNEI AS SEEKING TO THWART EVEN ATTEMPT TO GET 5TH
FREEDOM RIGHTS FROM THAILAND.
3. IN SINGAPORE CASE MUCH THE SAME CONSIDERATIONS APPLY EXCEPT
THAT BRUNEI HAS ALREADY HAD SOME EXPERIENCE OF TOUGHNESS OF SINGAPORE REACTIONS TO WHAT SIA HAVE REGARDED AS OVER-WEANING RBA
AMBITIONS AND OF BRUNEI'S OWN INABILITY ULTIMATELY TO STAND UP TO
SINGAPORE. RBA MAY CONSEQUENTLY BE MORE READY IN THIS CASE TO
APPRECIATE DANGER OF PRESSING THEIR 5TH FREEDOM REQUIREMENTS. ON THE OTHER HAND RBA'S NEW MANAGEMENT SEES ONLY THAT SIA HAS MULTIPLE
5TH FREEDOM RIGHTS WHILE RBA HAS NONE. THE EXPLANATION WE HAVE
CONFIDENTIAL
/ SO FAR