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ANOTHER FACET OF IT. ADMITTEDLY THE POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR HONG KONG OF A NEW MOVE TO INVEST IN CHINA (WHETHER IN PO ON OR ELSEWHERE), COULD NOT BE COMPARED WITH THOSE OF TRADITIONAL INVESTMENT IN, SAY, KOREA OR SINGAPORE, AND NEITHER THE SCALE, NOR WHETHER IT WOULD BE GOOD OR BAD FOR HONG KONG COULD BE PREDICTED AT THIS TIME. BUT WHETHER WE WISHED TO EVADE THEM OR NOT, NOTHING WOULD BE GAINED BY REFUSING A SUPPLY OF ELECTRICITY.
6. WITH REGARD TO (B) HE WAS ALREADY SUPPLYING MUCH MORE POWER
TO CPG-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN HONG KONG THAN THAT PROPOSED FOR PO ON.
NO NEW PRINCIPLE WAS INVOLVED SO THIS TOO COULD BE DISREGARDED.
7. WITH REGARD TO (C), THIS SIMPLY REPRESENTED PART OF THE COMMERCIAL/POLITICAL RISK INVOLVED IN ANY MAJOR TRANSACTION WITH CHINA. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THE RISK WAS NEGLIGIBLE, THOUGH THERE COULD BE NO GUARANTEE ABOUT THE FUTURE.
8. IF YOU OR PEKING DISSENT FROM THIS ADVICE, PERHAPS YOU WOULD
COMMENT.
MACLEHOSE
FILES HK & GD (6)
FED
TRED
ES & SD
MR CORTAZZI
MR MURRAY
MR STRATTON
MR BUTLER
MR THOMAS
MISS BROWN
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