?
inspriet bij The
that the semi 4 carryover
こ
hmm 1977 to 1973 ? Low to
q capnos
K、m. Aic
thi's wo Mubaby
sej
77
-5-
to the Agreement.
Referring to his earlier
point regarding the effects upon the MTN, he said that if the US proposed revisions to the Agreement which were in their effect outside the terms of the Agreement and made similar proposals to others, ldc attitudes to the TN would be affected. The reason why ldcs had been so difficult on safeguards arose from distrust, over-the way in which the MFA had been used particularly by the EEC. If in order to meet domestic pressures it seemed that the US was behaving in a way similar to that of the EEC, they were likely to conclude that there were no rules any more, therefore no safeguards, that might was right. STR said that the question was not quite as one sided as that. He believed that the surges of imports were due at least in part to irresponsible actions by some exporting countries.
11.
•
Ambassador Smith said that this year the US had received imports from HK which were 27.5% higher in volume than the previous year.
DTIC said this had been due to the fact that carryover had been denied HK from 1977-into 1975. Smith (onceded/that the US might ade a mistake; possibly it should have denied carry forward rather
The current than carry over-but that was history.
political concern was that if HK used its full potential next year this would be devastating. He had concluded that HK, in 1979, could increase its apparel exports by 21.2% over 1978, and in one
DT internosed particular cat egory by up to 1387%.
to say that to compare actual trade with access rights was not to compare like with like. Smith said that he recognised this but those on the Hill
The did not. They just looked at the numbers. facts were that next year HK's exports could be substantially higher than those of 1978. The USA was urgently seeking HK's assistance to reduce
this potentialy