..)
:
-4-
situations were gone. The STR wanted the DTIC to know what he was on HK's side, that he would be sad if he could rot convince the TIC of that. He urgently needed a mutual solution reached in a constructive way. That for him was the best solution. What the second best was he did not know. But he waited the possibilities of a mutuci solution explored before he began to te stify on the Hill in January of next year. He and Hollings were good friends but they had fallen out publicly
The Pre- and privately over the Hollings bill. sident's veto of the Hollings amendments had been a courageous act in the face of the pressures he was facing.
8.
DT IC expressed the view, that the prime
STR concern was with the MN rather than textiles. thought tha DTIC was reading the situation wrca-ly The Administration had a basic commitment to a liberal trade policy. Even if there had been no MTN, the President would have still vetoed the bill. DTIC said that if there had been no veto, there would nonetheless have been serious reper- cussions for the ITTN. STR thought a real risk remained of Hollings introducing his bill separately in the next seesion and if the President vetoed it, Mr. Barraclourh Congress would override the veto. agreed with the STR's assessment.
9.
STR would like an early indication of HK's attitude. If HK could help, then the US could help K. He would quite understand if HK felt it could not help, or if HK decided not to but he asked againto be told quickly to enablc him to look for other means to solve his problem.
10.
The DTIC .acknowledged that he was obliged to listen to any proposals for revisions