CONFIDENTTALENTIAL
problems. The rundown to 6000 Gurkhas announced in the Defence Review was clearly
tied to the termination of the Brunei commitment and it started to be clearly
demonstrable that the retention of a higher figure is the direct result of that
commitment continuing.
[9. Because of the continuing uncertainty over the Brunei commitment, the 1978
LTC contained main and alternative assumptions, stated in terms of battalions,
and depending on whether there would be a continuing requirement to station a
battalion in Brunei. Both assumptions were based on the premise (that we can no
longer fulfil) that amalgamation and rundown would have been completed by 1.4.79.
The main assumption was that the fourth battalion would remain in Brunei until
1983, and then move to UK, while the alternative assumed that the Brunei
commitment would have lapsed in 1979, enabling us to station the fourth battalion
in the United Kingdom. The financial consequences of the course of action
proposed in paragraph 8 are, in effect, similar to the alternative 1978 LTC
assumption, since the Brunei Government will continue to meet the full costs of
one battalion.] DS7 may be able to provide a form of words for para 9 to
reflect more accurately the LTC/cost implications of this scenario_7.
10. Termination of the present Anglo-Brunei Treaty without Replacement.
In this scenario it is assumed that
a. the Brunei battalion would be withdrawn over the course of 12 months
from the date of termination.
b.
we would retain the use of training facilities in Brunei, primarily
to continue the provision of an exercise outlet for the garrison in Hong
Kong (where exercise areas are at a premium), but also for British forces
generally. The degree of utilisation of these facilities would be such as
to justify a permanent Training Staff in the region of 200 Gurkhas, for
whom, we hope, the Sultan of Brunei may be persuaded to pay.
11. As a consequence, our requirement would be for 3 battalions in Hong Kong