From:
Mr B M Norbury Head of DS 11
D/DS11/7 S/DS11/6/5/4
SEOREA
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المسكويد:
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T MON
DROI
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Main Building, Whitehall, London SWIA 2HB
Telephone (Direct Dialling) o1-218 3287
(Switchboard) 01-218 9000
PseeTraff
"Govenur.
J A B Stewart Esq OBE
Hong Kong and General Department Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Dear Stewart,
HKK 0621
Jas
RECEIVED
7 January 1978
1 JAN 1978
See (+1)
Action T
DESK OFFICER
INDEX
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84, A
HONG KONG
it
Thank you for your letter of 6 January raising various matters of concern to Hong Kong in relation to Brunei. As you may be aware, CBF Hong Kong very recently made repres- entations to us similar to those which the Governor of Hong Kong has made to you. We understand Hong Kong's con- cern about reinforcement and access to the training facilities in Brunei and I hope that you will by now have seen a copy of our Minister of State's letter to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary of 6 January putting on the record that these are matters on which action will be necessary once there is a clear decision on withdrawal from Brunei.
2. Our intention has always been to consult Hong Kong about reinforcement once a decision had been reached on the with- drawal of the Gurkha battalion from Brunei. Unless, for some reason, the Sultan forces us to withdraw more rapidly than we would wish, we expect that it will take a year to plan and execute satisfactory arrangements for the withdrawal of the battalion. Thus there should be sufficient time to review and reach an understanding with Hong Kong on our reinforcement plans before the Gurkha battalion leaves Brunei. We feel that it would be for the FCO to take the lead in consultations. with the Hong Kong Government, but that we would undoubtedly need prior discussions with CBF on the factors involved in reinforcement.
3. I can confirm that the current position on reinforcement is as stated in Joint Theatre Plan No 30 (3rd revise). Assuming that the Gurkha battalion has been withdrawn from Brunei, we have made a preliminary assessment of the rein- forcement times that would be involved in deploying the whole force described in JTP 30 from the UK (ie, 2 infantry
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