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COVERING
SECRET
The Ambassador in Khartoun believes that the immediate
uirement is both valid and necessary. The Embassy have made hear that it is only now beginning to dawn on the Sudanese Pat they have let themselves in for by agreeing to host an OAU Surunit. In view of the importance of the occasion and the current threat to President Sadat, who will be attending the Summit, and, by association, to President Nimeiri, the Ambassador has recommended that we should meet the Sudanese request if we
are able to allocate adequate resources to the job. He has made clear that if we do not help someone less competent will do so.
3. When he saw President Nimeiri on 13 March Mr Judd discussed
braining collaboration between Britain and the Sudan. The
Zosident made clear that the Sudan tradiționally looked to Britain for training and had been disappointed that in the past wo had not provided as much as other countries, eg the Soviet
Union. The President said that the Sudan wanted more training from Britain. Mr Judd referred to our military training
sistance programme which he pointed out would be increased
in the coming financial year.
6.
Collaboration between our respective armed forces has been a major factor in our relations with the Sudan. The success of the British Army Training Team in Khartoum has led to political benefits out of proportion to the costs involved. There is no mbt that the provision of the type of SAS training that the danese now want would have similar benefits. The training would be purely anti-terrorist and would not be such as to cause Darrossment to mid were it to become publicly known that the
were involved. I do not think however that SAS advisers
bald remain in Khartoum for the Summit itself as the S have
gested.
The MCD say that the SAS can provide one SAS offier and bar a an from 1 May to 12 July to undertake the necessary training
an khoxboum. The Sudanese have said that they would meet all in-country costs and would pay the necessary air fares. The MOD
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CONFIDENTIAL
ST
/nave