SECRET
n
570
PRIORITY
CYPHER CAT A
FM FCO #918952
SECRET
TO PRIORITY TOKYO TELNO 197 OF 9-MAY
Aary PO.
1 0 MAY 1978
DENK OFFICES
PA
REGA
RY
See 80
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INFO HONG KONG (FOR GOVERNOR AND POLAD) PEKING MODUK (DS10) SECURITY SERVICES
®
(18
YOUR TELS NO 289 AND 300 COUNTER TERRORISM
1. WE ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO CLOSE LIAISON WITH THE JAPANESE ON ALL LEVELS IN COUNTER TERRORISM AND WILL DO OUR BEST TO MEET THEIR REQUIREMENTS, HOWEVER WE ACCEPT THE ADVICE IN HONG KONG TELNO 571 AND PEKING TELNO 264 THAT THE TRAINING SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE IN HONG KONG. THE SAS'S OBJECTIONS TO USING HEREFORD APPLY EVEN TO THE SMALL CADRE YOU ENVISAGE. IT THEREFORE LOOKS AS IF THE TRAINING WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PLACE IN JAPAN OR NOT AT ALL.
2. WE STILL DO NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND WHY A TRAINING VISIT BY THE
SAS WOULD CREATE PROBLEMS, WOULD IT BE WORTH SUGGESTING TO THE JAPANESE THAT AN INITIAL RECONNAISSANCE VISIT TAKE PLACE SO AS TO HELP THEM DECIDE WIIETHER THE SUBSEQUENT FIVE MAN, LONG VISIT WOULD RE LIKELY TO BE ACCEPTABLE? THE LATTER WOULD THEN ONLY TAKE PLACE IF THE JAPANESE WERE SATISFIED, IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR INITIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SAS, THAT THEIR FEARS WERE UNJUSTIFIED. WE COULD OF COURSE TAILOR A VISIT TO SUIT JAPANESE REQUIREMENTS, 3. DURING THE RECONNAISSANCE VISIT, THE TWO MEN, (A FIELD OFFICER AND A SENTOR NCO) WOULD AIM TO ADVISE ON *
A, SELECTION OF A COUNTER-HIJACKING/TERRORIST FORCE:
D. LOCATION AND TRAINING OF SUCH A FORCE:
C. COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF SUCH A FORCE, TAKING ACCOUNT OF
THE SYSTEM ALREADY EXISTING IN THE COUNTRY,
IN ORDER TO ENABLE THEM TO TAILOR THEIR ADVICE TO LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCE, THE TEAM WOULD NEED BRIEFING FROM THE HOST COUNTRY ON :-
A. THE THREAT
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B. POTENTIAL TARGETS
C. EXISTING POLITICAL CONTROL OF INCIDENT:
n, EXISTING POLICE/MILITARY RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDING PLANS, EQUIPMENT HELD AND STATE OF TRAINING,
'DET
14.