5.
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b. would wish to find a way of maintain-
ing for itself the benefits of
C.
continued British administration and
prosperity in Hong Kong for the time
being, and would realise that to
achieve this, some action by HMG over
the leases was necessary, and
would signify its approval through
silence if HMG acted to produce the
necessary results, provided this did
not prejudice China's basic position
over Hong Kong.
We concluded that either the leases would have to
be extended for a specific period (without the CPG extending
the lease of the New Territories), or powers would have to
be taken to exercise jurisdiction and to grant leases in
the New Territories for an indeterminate period instead of,
as at present, until 1 July 1997.
6.
Such a change, if tacitly acceptable to China,
could expose us to a demand for rendition before 1997,
as well as open a way to postponing rendition till after
1997. However the risk of the former is worth taking
since, in the absence of Chinese recognition of the Lease
agreement, we are open to such a demand already.
7.
Against this background we asked the Hong Kong
Solicitor-General how either of these changes could be
managed, within British law, and assuming the Chinese
Government agreed in advance. He was in particular
asked to address himself to the following questions
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/a.