CONFIDENTIAL
DSR 11C
(c) is that in (c) the UK would be prepared to push
further than COCOM and our partners would countenance
It
in the hope that they would acquiesce in a fait accompli.
In principle option (b) is the preferable one,
accommodating as it would most of our interests.
might however be important to keep in reserve the right
to proceed anyway as a means of inducing reluctant
partners to agree to changes in the COCOM rules which
we believe to be justified on their merits. Option (c)
might therefore be kept in reserve; whether to use it
would be a matter of judgment for Ministers at the time.
58. There remains a problem of timing. How early in
considering the sale of a particular item of defence
equipment or technology should we go to the Americans,
and then to our other CCCOM partners? On the one hand,
British companies may have to take the initiative with
the Chinese. As with the Spey deal, the latter may
need assurance that the companies have British Government
support. To give this support at an early stage, only
to remove it later because of fierce American opposition,
would waste the major effort in time and money which the
company had invested in the deal. There would also be
serious damage to relations with the Chinese Government,
who would not trust the British Government again.
59. On the other hand, it would be a waste of American
goodwill to seek their agreement to sales which the
Chinese later turned out not to want. This points to
the desirability, once the Government were confident
that we wished to sell a weapons system or components to
/Ching
CONFIDE! TIAL
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