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DSR 11C
CONFIDENTIAL
to a significant improvement in Chinese military
capabilities should not, however, be under-estimated.
Such sales would be interpreted as a deliberate anti-
Soviet act, and would be cited by the Soviet leadership
to help justify both for internal and external
purposes any eventual shift in Soviet policies
towards the West. In the shorter term there could
be adverse consequences for Anglo-Soviet political
relations (reflected, for example, in the frequency
and friendliness of Ministerial visits) and for UK
commercial interets in the USSR (see paragraph 38 above)
(c) Helping to improve China's defence potential
and industrial base will make it easier for her to
influence countries in the Third World, for example
by offering larger scale military as well as economic
assistance. This could be to the West's detriment,
although it could also usefully counter Soviet
influence. But as a rising industrial power China
will in any case be in a position to provide the kind
of military assistance many Third World countries are
likely to want regardless of Western defence sales
policies. Good trade will in fact do more to build
up China's political power than defence sales.
(a) A militarily stronger China would be better
able to give military help to, eg, North Korea, but
this would carry with it a greater influence over
North Korean policies, at the expense of the Soviet
Union and in favour of regional stability.
should be helpful to the West.
This
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CONFIDENTIAL
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