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Bermuda was not like a foreign country and it was as Governor and The Queen's Representative that he had decided to call for troops. Mr Cortazzi said that for the sake of good relations with Bermuda
and with the Ministry of Defence he hoped it would be possible to reach a compromise figure which would be somewhere between that for full costs and that for extra costs. He suggested that the Governor should tell the Premier that he had discussed the problem in London; that Bermuda's problem was understood, but that the MOD also had
their difficulties. The British Government did not want this to be a
source of conflict with Bermuda and were working on the problem and would be in touch with the Governor in due course. Sir Peter
Ramsbotham should not however make any commitment to the effect that the charges would be modified. The Governor agreed, adding that this would make the Bermuda Government think very hard before agreeing to ask for British troops in future.
8. Mr Cortazzi then moved the discussion on to internal security. He asked the Governor for his assessment of the quality of the police intelligence he had received before the riots. The Governor replied that violence had been expected but the degree of violence and the inability of the security forces to contain it had not been expected. Mr Macoun said that the disturbances were more protracted than had been foreseen. The Governor agreed.
9. Mr Cortazzi then said that, prompted by experience in Hong Kong, he wondered whether the Governor was satisfied with the advice he was
getting from his intelligence committee. ir Peter Ramsbotham said that with hindsight they had been too complacent. They had been planning on the likelihood of disturbances, but plans were based on the assumption that the two murderers would be reprieved. The circum- stances in which the riots took place were therefore different from those which had been envisaged.
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