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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
2.
of 28 October 1975 that, in the case concerned, the crunch had never come. He added that it was not thought profitable to pursue our suggestion in a hypothetical way at that stage. I briefed Sir Edwin to raise the subject again, verbally, when Sir Nick Larmour visited here towards the end of 1976. Whether he did so I am not sure: our files do not show. But, either way, nothing further happened before a decision had to be taken in the cases of Burrows and Tacklyn.
5. Their cases, and all the aftermath, have revived interest in the issue. We can see the argument, deployed by Hugh Cortazzi (paragraph 17 of the record of the meeting which he chaired during the Governor's visit), that a change of the kind we contemplate would make the Secretary of State's position more difficult. But the Secretary of State did not himself take the view that it would (the bottom of the second page of the record of his meeting with the Governor). There are, anyway, counter- arguments. For if, understandably, for their own reasons, HMG consider that capital punishment in dependent territories should, in effect, be subject to the Secretary of State's veto, as one price the territories must pay for remaining dependent, then the Secretary of State ought to be seen to exercise the veto personally: putting Governors under pressure to relieve him of the need to do so, by granting reprieves against local advice and wishes, inevitably places them in an invidious position, if the territories they govern have popularly elected legislatures and advanced consititutions. Of course, they have obligations to the Secretary of State as well as to their local governments and populations; but they have to live and work far more closely with the latter. Moreover, as the Secretary of State pointed out (see the same record), our proposal avoids possible conflict between a Secretary of State and a Governor; and this is surely better avoided.
6. Our second proposal concerned the say which the Premier should be given in the selection of certain Senior Officers. Correspondence about this opened with my letter of 23 August 1974 to Myles Preston and continued for just over six months. You will find Myles' replies in your file ANE 1/1: he wrote on 20 September and 22 October 1974, and on 10 February 1975. Although we remained obstinately unconvinced by his arguments, Sir Edwin and I agreed to let the matter rest, pending discussions about Bermuda's future status: my letter of 7 March 1975 to Sir Nick recorded this. It is being resurrected, because other constitutional amendments are again in the offing. There is nothing I need now add to what I said in my letters to Myles.
7. Our third proposal (with which I think you were disposed to agree in your letter HWB 373/1 of 16 December 1977, despite the lack of a precedent for it in a dependent territory) was intended to require formal consultation with the Leader of the Opposition, as well as with the Premier, before the appointment of a Chief Justice. In the light of what happened when James Astwood was appointed, and in view also of the need to encourage the PLP to behave more responsibly by identifying and, where possible, dealing with their grievances, the arguments for the proposal seem to us decisive.
8.
Finally, you will note that we have in no case suggested a precise This is deliberate: as all three proposals have still to be
amendment.
Cont'd
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL