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Thug, wheronp the disturbances of the kind recently experienced by Bermuda could be avoided by means of a reprieve, they could not be in an associated utate. If the currying out of executions in an associated state led to trouble, and wo wore anked to intervene, it would be too late to put premurro on the government for redream und we would be faced with a difficult choice. But in practice there has only been a threat of trouble in one case (Desmond Trotter in Dominica) and in that instance the local government granted a reprieve. There would at Joust be no suggestion of white bureaucrats in London authorining the execution of black, and again, wo would always have the option to keep out of any trouble. The banic problem hørg in not one of romponsibility for internal nocurály; 1 mumpect that turionu problem will only arise in placed Fiko Bermuda where, however gonuinely, local whites find themselves holding power in a predominently black community.
10. 1 consider that in most respectu ussociated statehood has been a successful and satisfactory arrangement. It is true that we are regularly approached about the alleged excesses and incompetence of the governments, but this is a minor irritation which we can dispose of, even in Parliament, by pointing out that we have no responsibility. No doubt this presents a far more serious problem in the dependent territories, where Ministers are answerable to Parliament.
11. Situations could arise where an associated state government might act in breach of international laws or conventions, and where we would then be expected to enforce the rules in the territory concerned. In theory this should be no problem, because we have agreements with all the states that in such circumstances they will do as we ask, and if they refuse to do so we have the power to legislate for them at Westminster. A difficult situation could arise if we were compelled to pass such legislation and they then continued to act in breach of it. Short of sending in troops and forcing them to comply at gun-point, and leaving the troops there indefinitely, there would be nothing we could do. This is what is meant by the statement that we have responsibility without power. But in fact this has never happened; so far as I know the Associated States have always behaved themselves in this respect and have accepted our final word.
In any case, is the situation in the dependen: territories, in practical terms, really Yu. all that different?
12. There have been difficulties in certain areas where a division of responsibility can lead to a stalemate. Civil Aviation is the main example: British Airways fares increases have to be approved in certain circumstances by the Associated States. They usually agree in the end but only after long delays and a great deal of wrangling. But BA always have the ultimate weapon of suspending or curtailing services if they become uneconomic. I doubt whether this is a significant consideration.
one.
13. In general our relationship with the Associated States has been a smooth
Were it not for the issues of Anguilla and independence I should think that one grade 7 could comfortably handle all five territories. But then, if you take away the question of aid, just how heavy is the burden of handling dependent territory work? Associated statehood does not remove the workload on aid; it simply shifts it to the ODM.
14. In conclusion, I consider that the main difficulties we have faced with the associated states are not necessarily of a type which occurred because of associated statehood. I suspect that some of them are similar to the difficulties we have with the dependent territories anyway, and legislative measures could be taken to avoid some of the remainder in any new form of association. In considering whether we should offer a similar status to
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