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Separate Independence
10. of those territories whose independence would not significantly prejudice the interests of the inhabitants, however that is
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those which have reasonable prospects of becoming viable politically and economically our objective should be to direct our policies (including aid policies) to self determination and the realisation of independence. Where there is persistent local reluctance to seek independence, we may have to offer special inducements, eg. in terms of guarantees of aid. Such inducements should not however include the offer of any defence guarantee, since following the Defence Review we are unlikely to have the capability to meet commitments if called upon to do so, and they are therefore only likely to prove an embarrassment. Some territories which can be expected to achieve economic viability may, nevertheless need increased aid in the short term in order to facilitate their progress to independence. Other inducements such as the offer of overseas representation on independence may be attractive to small territories with fewer than 100,000 inhabitants, which - as micro-states may find it difficult or may not wish to proceed to full UN membership after independence. New Zealand's 1962 treaty with Western Samoa may provide a useful precedent. It provides that the metropolitan power will "consult on matters of mutual interest and concern", undertake consular protection and act as an agent in foreign affairs when requested to do so.
Alternative Solutions
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For
11. However some territories appear to have such limited productive resources (at least in the light of present knowledge) that they can never expect to become economically viable. these territories, therefore, separate independence may not be practicable and the choice may lie between the following options:
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