CONFIDENTIAL
no alternative that would detach the Force from the hard core mutineers and ensure total support from the public in case of a rejection. He also agreed that the sooner we announced the amnesty the better, or we might be faced with having to grant better terms in return for Police restoring law and order.
14.
I discussed with him the advisability of holding up action until we had convened a meeting of the Executive Council. But because it was late (by then about 7.45) and to be effective the announcement would need to be made not later than 9 pm, he felt it would serve no purpose. He felt sure that presented with the same facts, his colleagues would reach the same conclusion themselves, namely that, however regrettable, there was no alternative.
15. There was no time to prepare the press for the announcement or give adequate background briefing, and the reaction of the English-language press was shocked and critical, though that of the Chinese press cautious and relieved. The English press had been a good deal influenced by television scenes of crowds of policemen celebrating the announcement of the amnesty under their However then mistaken impression that it was complete. during the Sunday it became apparent that they had decided to reject it and were prepared to take progressive non-law-enforcement measures until their demands for
While the situation still a complete amnesty were met. remained that we could not deal with the mutineers by force, it had changed in that their rejection of the amnesty had lost them all public sympathy, and support by the rest of the Force was in doubt since it had been freed from fear of arrest or sense of grievance.
16. At a meeting of leading editors that evening I was impressed by the unanimity with which they urged no concession and promised total support if I stood firm. I, of course, assured them that there was no question of
Later TV station owners any further concessions whatever. gave similar assurances.
17.
During that night Denys Roberts and Brian Slevin thought out the idea of taking powers of summary dismissal (para 17 of my tel 1099). Such powers would enable men's pay and pensions to be forfeited if they were identified disobeying the Commissioner's orders. The identifications could be by camera or other means not involving direct confrontation or the use of force. It was a most potent weapon with which to reinforce the splitting off of the 99% covered by the amnesty from the 1% that was not.
CONFIDENTIAL
/ 18.