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b) The 1974 recession clearly had rather traumatic
but
fortunately brief--effects in Hong Kong. But it is not necessarily a
unique event; the world economic outlook is increasingly uncertain, and the
economy of Hong Kong is (as I noted in my introduction) unbalanced and vulner
able. A sharper and more enduring recession than that of 1974 might very
well, in view of the apparent preoccupation of Hong Kong employees with
security, set off a spontaneous or alternative radical labour and political
movement, which would be quite capable of producing an autonomous
industrial and political crisis. Despite their superficial
conventionality,
one can see, for instance, considerable potential for a local version
of the French events of 1968 among Hong Kong students and workers.
c) I could not claim, in the brief period allocated so far to
this study, to have examined (or even had access to) all the evidence.
But some familiarity with a variety of developing countries leaves me with
a distinct impression--despite the Chinese dislike of ostentatious consumption
as
a normality--that an industrial economy like Hong Kong is highly
vulnerable to international criticism of its contrast of poverty with
overweening wealth. I am not convinced that its workers have shared
appropriately in its prosperity.
d) Even a brief expert acquaintance with Hong Kong suggests
there are things--like the planned raising of the school leaving-age or
introduction of paid annual holidays--where movement is ponderously slow
compared with the alacrity of Hong Kong's "establishment" when a potential
for profit is concerned.
e) Despite, again, its apparent bustle and efficiency, there
are pockets of inefficiency in Hong Kong industry and commerce which
survive only from their access to cheap, immobile labour--and can continue
to do so even while new industries are suffering from labour shortage.