+
73E
0000735
Director of Civil Aviation
SECRET
MEMO
From..
Ref. (10
Tel. No.
Date..
L/M BILAT/132/1C
..in..
5-282424 E. 21
31st January, 1977
Secretary for Economic Services
To
(43)
Your Ref......
„In.
SCR 13/4841/59
14.1.77
dated
161 833
4.
Proposed Airport at Macau
26x3
I am sorry for the delay in replying to your memorandum, but
has taken some time to study the air traffic control aspects this proposal.
2.
With regard to para. 2(d) of Milton's letter to Drace-Francis, it is of interest that the expressed UK policy (not previously stated so explicitly) of preserving the value of Kai Tak as a bargaining counter to secure rights for British airlines runs almost directly contrary to our own objective, as frequently expressed to H.M.G., i.e. "Hong Kong's interest is not in restriction of traffic, either to maintain the value of traffic rights at Hong Kong for purposes of bargaining, or to regulate capacity to demand in order to maintain general airline profitability. Rather it is to maximize use of Hong Kong as an air communication centre. both for the indirect economic benefit this brings and for the direct revenue accruing from airport charges."
3.
Although no doubt the UK policy line will continue to govern the use of Kai Tak, thereby denying services such as those required by SAS, KLM, Air France, etc., DOT's fear that the opening of a major international airport at Macau would be a major blow to British Aviation interests seems somewhat exaggerated. Firstly, the number of services through Kai Tak which HMG has refused has been very small in proportion to total operations. Given the ambition to expand British airlines' services, in exchange for rights at Kai Tak for foreign carriers, this position should not change significantly for many years. Even when Kai Tak reaches its maximum handling capacity, the value of services would increase with higher load factors, no discounting, etc., thereby tending to preserve the value of Kai Tak as a bargaining counter. Secondly, passengers and cargo flows are not generated by the construction of airports per se. They are dictated by the location of customer demand. In this area the demand is centred on Hong Kong, and carriage by air to Macau then by sea to Hong Kong would prove less attractive in many cases than a change en-route from an airline which did not have Hong Kong traffic rights to one which did.
4.
There is, however, far more weight in the DOT's concern over air traffic control problems. With an airport at Macau and the existing Hong Kong Airport operating simultaneously, severe confliction would arise should the runway at Macau be aligned East-West. Whilst Area Control services would at all times have to be provided by Hong Kong since all routes into and out of Macau, save those due North, would perforce lie in the Hong Kong FIR, Hong Kong might also have to undertake Macau's Approach Control service wheneyer approaches were made from the East, or take-offs took place to the East. At all other times, and even if a North-South runway was in operation at Macau, direct and close liaison would have to be instituted between the respective Approach/Departure Control Offices. In the event of Chek Lap Kok Airport being constructed, the Approach Control liaison problem would be even more acute and it would seem likely that Hong Kong Approach Control would have to cover both, Airports, Macau only taking over control of local traffic in the immediate vicinity of its airport. With Chek Lap Kok and Macau both in operation
SECRET
/simultaneously