RESTNOTED

ACCEPTABLE. IN A NUMBER OF LENGTHY INTERVENTIONS HE ARGUED, IN SUPPORT OF HIS INSTRUCTIONS, THAT THE BREAK CLAUSE WOULD NOT

ORK EFFECTIVELY AND THAT IT WAS MUCH PREFERABLE TO GO FOR A LESSER (25%) TARIFF CUT WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS THAN AN AMBITIOUS (40%) TARIFF CUT WHICH WOULD POSE AT LEAST PRESENTATIONAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRESENT FRENCH ECONOMIC SITUATION. HE THEREFORE FAVOURED THE FIRST STAGE BUT NO COMMITMENT TO ANY SECOND STAGE, AND ANYWAY WANTED A STRICT PARALLELI SM BETWEEN TARIFFS AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS INCLUDING, PARTICULARLY, CUSTOMS VALUATION, AND SELECTIVE SAFEGUARDS.

6.

GRAY

GRAY (UK) SAID THAT HE RECOGNISED THE FRENCH PREOCCUPATIONS AND THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO ASK WHY THE AMERICANS ARGUED THAT A TARIFF CUT OF 40% PROVIDED A BETTER DEFENCE AGAINST GROWING WORLD PROTECTIONI SM THAN A CUT OF 25%. IT WAS CONCEIVABLE, IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THAT IF BARRIERS TO TRADE WERE REDUCED TO AN EXTRAVAGANT DEGREE THE PROTECTIONISTS WOULD BE ENCOURAGED RATHER THAN DISCOURAGED. NEVERTHELESS A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME TO THE NEGOTIATION WAS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM'S VIEW IMPORTANT AND THE WORKING HYPOTHESIS ON TARIFF CUTS COULD NOT BE RULED OUT. THUS IF THE POSSIBILITIES OPENED BY THE STRAUSS/HAFERKAMP DISCUSSIONS WERE TO BE REALISED IT SEEMED PROBABLE THAT AT LEAST TWO CONDITIONS WOULD NEED TO BE SATISFIED. THE FIRST WAS THAT THE BREAK CLAUSE BETWEEN THE TWO STAGES WOULD BE REAL NOT DEVISED TO PREVENT THE SECOND STAGE FROM COMING INTO EFFECT BUT A RECOGNITION THAT IF THE WORLD, INCLUDING THE UK, WERE MOVING INTO A NEW RECESSION AND UNEMPLOYMENT WAS HIGH THE SECOND PHASE CUTS COULD BE RECONSIDERED. SECONDLY, THAT, WHILE THE IMPORTANCE OF TARIFFS (AGAINST, FOR EXAMPLE, EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES) WAS DEBATABLE BECAUSE IN CERTAIN AREAS TARIFFS (EVEN AT PRESENT LEVEL) PROVIDED NO EFFECTIVE PROTECTION AGAINST ASIATIC COMPETITION PARTICULARLY SOME EARLY, AND PARALLEL, WORKING HYPOTHESIS ON A SELECTIVE SAFEGUARD WAS INDISPENSABLE. IT WAS NOT ENOUGH TO SAY THAT EVERY ELEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATION WAS SUBJECT TO REVIEW IN THE LIGHT OF THE EVENTUAL PACKAGE: IF ADVANCE PROGRESS WAS TO BE SEEN TO BE MADE ON THE TARIFF FORMULA THEN ADVANCE PROGRESS HAD TO BE SEEN TO BE MADE IN THE AREAS HE HAD MENTIONED,

7.

AND

ABRAMOWSKI (GERMANY) PREDICTABLY TOOK A LESS HARD LINE AND, FOR EXAMPLE, ARGUED THAT CONDITIONS FOR MOVEMENT TO A SECOND STAGE OF TARIFF REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE PRECISELY LAID DOWN IN ADVANCE. BUT IN SUCCESSIVE INTERVENTIONS HE DID NOT PRESS THIS POINT TOO HARD

3 DESTRICTED)

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