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wi recent
di Zur. vis
locally and in Whitehall, and was a matter on which the Chiefs
of Staff bore ultimate responsibility. While I do not suggest
that HE The Governor is in fact seeking to gain administratively
a point not conceded at the negotiating table, it is nonetheless
difficult to envisage the purpose of such a review unless the
security situation (including the reinforcement capability) was
changed markedly. Leaving aside for the moment the Brunei
implications, initial reactions here are that while a thorough
reasse "cment of the size and cost of the garrison as a whole
will be necessary before the DCA falls due for renewal in 1983,
so early a review of the teeth-arm element is unlikely to serve
any pose. I should be grateful for your own views on this.
b. Provision to the Hong Kong Government of Details of
Manpower Adjustments.
This is agreed to be a reasonable price to pay for the avoid-
ance of an early review of the support element. However, I
am somewhat concerned by the statement in paragraph 10 of your
letter of 6 April to HE The Governor that "by the end of the
financial year 1978/79 it might be possible to achieve some
real vinge against the assessed Garrison personnel costs
portrayed in the MOU". There is a danger that in the course
of time this comment might assume the status of a firm under-
taking.
C.
Reinforcement.
HE The Governor's wish to be consulted before any change is
(It-k-rel is soo
made in reinforcement capabilities has been brought to the
and hartzeak ta can wi attention of the FCO who will take it into account
The
May)
has about
tas folu
importanceof the Brunei battalion for the rapid
Ato
reinforcement of Hong Kong, and the
Gurkhar un Baunei
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