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exactly what the US was doing.
He had already had one such conversation when it was clear that much of what he said was new to the Chinese. Mr Cortazzi said that perhaps we should all tell the Chinese more of what we were doing to counter the Russians in Africa. Mr Holbrooke warmly supported this. He hoped that our Ambassador in Peking would take time to talk to Mr Woodcock when he arrived in Peking. He also hoped that some of Secretary Vance's party would also be able to make contact during the visit in August. Mr Gleysteen said it was important not to be defensive with the Chinese on Africa. We should take a matter of fact approach whether it was Angola or Rhodesia and give our reasons for our policies. Mr Holbrooke said the Americans did not like being lectured on Africa by people who were doing nothing. Mr Cortazzi agreed that we should attempt to brief the Chinese more about what we were doing in Africa. He also drew on recent reports about Chinese attitudes.
VIETNAM
11. Mr Holbrooke said the US were ready to establish diplomatic relations with Hanoi. But the US Congress had made it absolutely clear that they would not approve any economic aid. The UK could be helpful here. The US believed it was in their strategic interest to have relations with Vietnam. The countries in the area agreed. Mr Cortazzi said this was also the UK view. Mr Holbrook said that whilst the Vietnamese did not say that aid was a precondition, they did say it was linked with progress towards normalisation. The US did not intend to propose any further talks until the autumn. But unlike the Chinese over Taiwan, the Vietnamese had left themselves some room to manoeuvre. They could reconsider their stand. То the extent that the UK had access to the Vietnamese at a political level, he suggested that the following points should be made:
(i)
(ii)
Jimmy Carter wanted to put the war behind him; he had done everything within the power of the Executive Branch, except lift the trade embargo which he had said should await the restoration of diplomatic relations;
the President was way ahead of the public and Congress on this issue. Although it was not a major one, there were deep emotions under-lying it;
(iii) Progress could only be made on a step by step basis;
if
the Vietnamese really wanted aid and trade, it would have to be a gradual process. They had to realise that the present Administration had disarmed left wing opinion. There was absolutely no domestic pressure on the Administration to give aid to Vietnam. In some sense the Vietnamese were prisoners of their successful propa- ganda during the war, when they had had impact on
This leverage no longer existed
US domestic opinion. in their favour.
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Mr Oakley