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the Japanese had handled this issue could cost them dear in terms of their personal relations with the new Administration.

Mr Heginbotham asked how the UK tackled the imbalance. Mr Cortazzi said we wanted major Japanese purchases as well as continuing a sectoral restraint. The signature of a reprocessing agreement would be very significant, as the Japanese had pointed out to the UK but we recognised the complexities of this issue. Japanese did not always get enough credit for what they did. had paid attention to sensitive areas, had sent purchasing missions, and had helped through the IMF. We were trying to develop contacts

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at the highest political level. Mr Heginbotham said the Japanese tended to respond to bilateral pressure from the European Community or the US at the expense of the other. Joint US/EC action would be better. The steel question was the first test, from the US side to see if the EC and the US could work jointly. The US would be holding bilateral talks in Japan in September at sub-cabinet level.

Mr Holbrooke said that Dick Cooper would attend with Tony Solomon or Fred Bergsten from the Treasury. Mr Cortazzi thought it would be helpful if the US team to the talks could discuss the problems in advance with us. Could one of them perhaps come through London. Mr Holbrooke thought this would be helpful. Mr Heginbotham thought the Commission's sessions in Japan would be useful in keeping the European Community angle in the Japanese mind.

3. Mr Holbrooke said the President would never stop trying to de-politicise the issues to avoid an anti-Japanese virus getting to work. The tendency was there and growing strongly in public opinion. We should look upon Mr Strauss's appointment not so much as to negotiate with other countries, but to defuse and break up domestic coalitions which favoured a negative approach to the Japanese problem. The Japanese understood this although they always complain- ed about the European attitude in terms which amounted to saying "At least you Americans understand us a little better than the European Community", The private sector too in Japan suffered from the same feelings of isolation, particularly from the European centres.

At the London Summit it had been the US who had insisted on full equality for Japan against, notably, French footdragging.

4. Mr Heginbotham asked what the European reactions were to the President's suggestion of a permanent seat for Japan on the Security Council. Mr Cortazzi said that we had real doubts about this: there were surely dangers in opening up the UN Charter. Mr Holbrooke suggested that it would cost the UK nothing to support the idea since the Russians would ensure that it never happened. The President had made that suggestion because it went directly to the Japanese feelings of inferiority. They, in return, had been very appreciative. A similar example of how to secure political dividends from a relatively small investment was the UN University to be sited near Tokyo. This was the first international institution to be sited in Japan. The US were giving a ten million dollar grant subject to Congressional approval. The Japanese had mentioned this fact with appreciation at every high level meeting there had been.

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Mr Fukuda

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