CONFIDENTIAL
DSR 11C
At the same time we should continue, vigorously the
efforts now under way to relax the rules in COCOM to
allow strategic criteria to be taken into account and
to improve the exceptions procedure.
39. The question arises how far China's interest in
particular items of sensitive defence equipment should
be stimulated or allowed to develop in advance of
consultations with the Americans. It would normally
seem sensible to have a reasonably clear idea of Chinese
interest, since it would not serve our interest to put the
US Administration through the hoops on successive
prospective arms sales which in the event got no further.
But to break the ice it may be desirable, once we were
confident in our own minds that we wished to sell a
weapons system or components to China (eg Harriers or
marine turbines), to raise the matter with the Americans
before we knew Chinese intentions. Such a discussion
would set parameters for future sales even if the sale in
question fell through (or was not pursued by the UK as
a result of the discussion). It would do British interests
in China no good to see Chinese expectations aroused and
then disappointed. Once we have a clearer picture of US
views on the whole question of arms sales to China it may
be possible to identify a range of less sensitive military
equipment which would fall within the guidelines we sot
ourselves (ie that it should not increase significantly
Chinese offensive capability) and in which it would be safe
to seck to stimulate Chinese interest. A preliminary list
of such equipment is at Annex
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