CONFIDENTIAL
DSR 11C
35.
Against this background, there are broadly four options for British policy in relation to arms sales to
China
(a) to avoid selling defence or defence related equipment to China which might be difficult to get through
COCOM;
(b) to promote arms sales within the limits of what the British Government believe to be acceptable in strategic terms, to seek COCOM agreement to such sales
and abide by the result;
(c) as in (b) above, but in the last resort going ahead despite opposition in COCOM and from our partners;
(a) to promote arms sales without regard to the results of consultations in COCOM or with our partners.
36. The only real strategic objection to defence sales to China identified in this paper would be if such sales increased China's capability seriously to threaten her neighbours. Many arms sales will fall short of this or wil
no
do/more than delay the achievement of such a capability, which will in any case be constrained by Chine's
concentration on internal economic development and concern On the other hand, with the threat from the Soviet Union. other states in the region and the United States, which still has defence commitments there, have different perceptions which it would be dangerous not to take into account. Moreover, Britain has a strong interest in the maintenance of COCOM against the Soviet Union and would damage its own interests if it defied the United States by going ahead with a sale despite COCOM and to which the
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