CONFIDENTIAL
5. As you know, the visiting mission to the Caymans went off very well, but when the Committee came to debate the report, the Russians and their allies were not prepared to go along with the normal formula of "approving" the report. A compromise whereby the report was "accepted" was eventually worked out. The high level interest taken by the Russians in the "Barbadian initiative" when it surfaced in the Second Committee also gives rise to
I would not, for instance, be surprised to see calls for a substantive debate on WIAS in the Committee of 24 during its next session.
concern.
6. We had had in mind, therefore, telling Ambassador Salim that we were not intending to invite a visiting mission in 1978. It is for this reason that the possibility of Committee of 24 supervision or observation of the Banabans referendum comes at such a useful juncture for us. If we can be cooperative over this, on the assumption that it comes off, we may well be let off the hook. We might even be able to be somewhat more catholic in terms of the selection of mission members than we would in the case of a fact-finding mission. At the same time, we must, I think, gently make it clear to the sensible members of the Committee that we cannot be expected to be cooperative about continuing to invite visiting missions on fact-finding tours of our territories if the Committee is going to fight shy of approving the reports of its own missions. This will be a useful marker if we wish, for whatever reason, not to invite a visiting mission in 1979.
7. I should be grateful to have your comments on these thoughts before 16 January, at about which time we shall be thinking of a call on Salim. might perhaps also bear in mind that we will be seeing Governor Smith from farawa on about 25 January about the nuts and bolts of a mission to his territory.
You
You
ever,
Tohin
Copies:
JM O Snodgrass Esq PDTD, FCO
PC Duff Esq WIAD, FCO
RAC Byatt
CONFIDENTIAL