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10. In summing up this part of the discussion Mr Stanley saið that we could not at this stage recommend any fundamental change in the policy in the 1975 despatch.
11. However even if we assumed that there was no conclusive reason why any of the five island dependencies should fail to reach independence could we simply accept the present uncertain time table. The BVI would probably be the first and we might hope that all should be off our hands within 10 years. For the time being we would go on badgering territories out of budgetary aid and help them with judicious project aid and technical cooperat- ion to adopt investment policies which would create employment and earn revenue. Meanwhile we should think very carefully before we grant further instalments of constitutional advance unless they were tied in some way to a programme which led to independence. Civil services should remain under the direct control of Governors through Public Service Commissions. Mr Stanley agreed with the views[and] expressed that something more than this would be needed to shift the territories out of
However
their apathy for independence. Our present policy - "stay as long as you wish - go when you feel like it" - was felt by some thinking West Indians to devalue our relationship with our Caribbean dependencies because of its overtones of not caring much which way things went. Although we could not force independence on a territory which did not want it, a more positive policy was desirable.
12. We needed somehow to spread the word that things had to change dependencies had to be brought to recognise that the British connection in its present form could not continue for ever; after some 300 years of Colonial relationship we saw the need to take a fresh look at the picture; we did not feel we were fulfilling our obligation under the UN Charter and wanted to put more impetus behind the move to independence. This sort of announcement might be best put over in several ways rather than in one formal policy statement. We should take advantage of every opportunity: Speeches in the UN, Parliament, at major social functions and think pieces in newspapers.
13. We might go on to invite Governments of the dependencies to discussions in London with the purpose of consulting them on the best way forward. We should make this process of consult- ation seem important.
This invitation would be limited to the Caribbean island dependencies. We should need to protect our position in other colonies (eg Belize, Falkland, Gibraltar, Hong Kong) and watch implications for the Associated States.
14. When it came to the time of decision, territories would expect satisfactory assurances of their economic future. Local politicians (particularly in the Caymans) could seek guarantees of their ability to continue to provide the social and adminis- trative services their people had grown accustomed to. They might ask for some revenue guarantee (a sort of Stabex) against the effects of independence on international confidence and prosperity. This would not be forthcoming but orthodox British aid did not stop at independence.
15. fir Stanley said that the Department would work up proposals on these lines in London, in consultation with OAGS. They agreed.
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