Mr Milton
yaton
P/A
CONFIDENTIAL
du. Jasper Res
арала
Reference HKG 012/5
that we can await
ше
information from FAD (perhaps
miüuko
16 June to Mr. Carlow)
aus tulleer
in necpruce to your
пори
Dr. Milton
22/6
Noturing
is
and which
SEYCHELLES: COUP
1.
East African Department have now provided a copy of Mr Ewans' minute of 17 June giving the Departments first thoughts about the Coup in the Seychelles. It will be interesting to go more deeply into the more recent events in the Seychelles when a further in-depth study is available from EAD, but it will perhaps be something of an academic exercise unlikely to provide practical guidelines for the future of the remaining Dependent Territories. As Mr Stanley has commented, each Territory is so different and has such special problems, especially in the Pacific area, that we shall probably not find much direct inspiration from the Seychelles experience.
2.
The Seychelles appear to have been practically unique in their pre-independence political pattern. It is interesting that the informal agreement between Mr Rene and Mr Mancham was considered to be practicable at the time although its eventual outcome was foreseen. This would seem to support the principle that the Territories should be allowed to evolve in their own particular ways and eventually work out their own salvation.
3.
However, some matters of general interest are likely to emerge, for instance, suitable forms of Government for Dependent Territories preparing for independence are considered in the run-up to independence. Some modification of the Westminster system might be considered necessary in certain of the remaining Territories, particularly those with a small population. Another important point is the need to ensure that the DTS develop a strong administrative framework before Independence, and an efficient Civil Service capable of carrying on day to day Government in the face of possible political shocks at the top.
hot mode "executive"
before wall pondence?
Dinn
22/6.
22 June 1977
J. Jase
J S Jasper
Hong Kong and General Department K270
233-4069
CODE 18-77
CONFIDENTIAL
A
दिवार
Mr Mansfield
SEYCHELLES:
COUP
CONTTDELENOVE
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 51
27 JUN 1977
HKC :012/5
ли. Гастро
Dim
5k
(N
7
1. Mr Pugh has helpfully set down in the attached letter dated 9 June, his preliminary understanding of the development and execution of the coup and his views on the new leadership and the future prospects. I shall be acknowledging and commenting where
necessary.
2.
His account would seem to confirm our view that the coup was internally inspired (though some of the plotters may have received training and other assistance from abroad, notably Tanzania); that it was well planned and executed; and that President Rene and his Government are reasonably secure, at least in the short-term. Rene's precise rôle in the coup is unclear but the coup seems likely to have had at least his tacit approval. There was little bloodshed and the only foreigners detained were the Chief Justice and five British Police Officers who were summarily deported. With one exception, they were not physically ill-treated.
3. The new Government has so far given few indications of the specific policies it will follow. Mr Pugh suggests that our first dialogue with the new Administration about the Anglo-Seychelles' Islands' Agreement (under which third parties other than the United States may be denied access to Seychelles for operational military activities) should give some pointers. The Seychelles authorities have subsequently consulted Mr Pugh, in terms of the Agreement, about a proposed French military flight transiting Seychelles. This is a promising development, though we should perhaps not attach too much significance to it at this early stage.
A.
Mr Mancham would seem to have himself largely to blame for the downfall of his Government (he might, for example, have brought Mr Rene with him to the CGM and should perhaps have listened more carefully to his expatriate security and police advisers, in addition to the obvious points of spending rather longer in Seychelles and not trying to tamper with the Constitution). But he probably still enjoys some popularity in Seychelles and in the longer term, Mr Rene is likely to face difficulties both from supporters of Mr Mancham and his policies and from the extremist wing of his own party.
5.
We are likely to see a steady reduction in the freedom and laissez-faire policies which have become the hallmark of Seychelles, but whilst Mr Rene remains in effective charge we should be able to maintain businesslike relations with his Government. We may also, through such channels as our aid programme and our High Commission be able to exert a significant moderating influence. This should clearly be our aim.
U
17 June 1977
CONFIDENTIAL
?
M K Ewans
East African Department/Copied
+
CONFIDENTIAL
Copied to:
Mr Clay, Defence Dept Mr Littlefield, PUSD Mr du Boulay, P & CD Mrs Chitty, CCD
Mr Rycroft, Consular Dept Mr Upton, News Dept
Dr Cashmore, Research Dept Mr Bickford, Legal Advisers OID
IPD
OPA
HKGD
PS/Mr Judd PS/PUS
Sir A Duff Mr Graham
Mr Stanley
Dr Wilson, Cabinet Office
MOD (DS11 and DI 4)
2
CONFIDENTIAL