3. Britain in China
It was trade that first took Britons to Hong Kong, particularly opium smug- gling. Opium grown in India was exported by British merchants, under licence granted by the East India Company, into China. By 1832 the opium duty was pro- viding one eighteenth of British India's gross revenue, and contributing substan- tially to Britain's balance of trade. When the Chinese Emperor Tao-Kuang deter- mined to stamp out this evil trade the British and Indian Governments with the East India Company resolved to defend it.
the treaties
The result was the first Opium War (1840-42) which was terminated by the Treaty of Nanking 1842. Under this the island of Hong Kong was ceded in per- petuity to Britain, whereupon it became the major centre for the continuing opium trade. Further hostilities, during which Lord Elgin burned the Summer Palace in Peking and then formally entered the city in state borne on a litter, resulted in Stonecutters Island and a part of the mainland of China-the Kowloon Penin- sula--also being ceded in perpetuity to Britain by the Convention of Peking 1860. (Some doubt has existed over the consti- tutional status of the area known as Kowloon City, but Hong Kong Courts have ruled that British jurisdiction does prevail there.) Finally, following the Sino- Japanese War of 1894-5 the area known as the New Territories was leased to the Crown for a 99 year term from 1898. The lease therefore on the New Territories, which includes the area of the mainland north of Kowloon up to the Shum Chum river and 235 islands, expires on 1 July 1997. Thus, in a famous phrase, Hong Kong is a borrowed place, living on bor- rowed time. Without the New Territories, which cover 366 of the Colony's 400 square miles and include major industrial centres, the Colony's position would scarcely be viable, and many expect that when the lease falls in, Britain will also cede back to China Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon peninsula.
But 1997 may not be as important as it appears. First, no-one doubts that mili-
tarily China could take Hong Kong at any moment if it chose. A telephone call would be enough. Second, the Peking government has never recognised what it regards as "the unequal treaties." Hong Kong in the eyes of Peking always has been and still is, Chinese territory. Soon after her entry into the UN the People's Republic made clear in a letter dated 8 March 1972 that: "The settlement of the questions of Hong Kong and Macau is entirely within China's sovereign right and does not at all fall under the category of 'colonial territories.' Consequently, they should not be included in the list of Colonial Territories covered by the De- claration on the Granting of Independ- ence to Colonial Countries and Peoples." On more than one occasion China has said that the question of Hong Kong will be dealt with "when conditions are ripe." In this way the Chinese Government has reserved the right to act before 1997 or even after it. After all, if in Chinese eyes Hong Kong has always been part of China and conditions are not ripe" in 1997 then China would not lose any face by allowing the status quo to remain. This is mere speculation of course, as it must be, but it brings out the crucial point: the key to Hong Kong's future lies in Peking.
the constitution
66
Meanwhile, the present is effectively in the hands of the Hong Kong government and big business. The formal, constitu- tional position can be quickly outlined (for a comprehensive discussion, see the chapters by J. Rear in Hopkins (ed), Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony, OUP, 1971).
Hong Kong has no representative gov- ernment. Responsibility for its govern- ment is vested in the Governor who is appointed by the British Foreign Secre- tary. He and the civil service he com- mands are responsible in law to the British Crown and not to the people of Hong Kong, who have no constitutional power to remove them from office. The legisla- ture consists of the Governor acting by and with the advice and consent of a
Page 105Page 106