ourselves had brought matters into sharper focus (your telegram No.67) on the eve of a visit by Mr Phan Hein, the special envoy of the Vietnamese Government.
4. I confess that it was not very easy to gauge Burmese thinking on all this during the last fortnight. The atmosphere of suspicion and fear that was rife once rumours of the Captain's Plot began to circulate in mid-July, made contact with the Burmese particularly difficult. But sufficient hints were dropped to sugg- est that Cortazzi's intervention had been unwelcome (possibly Ne Win's own reaction) and that a quick solu- tion to the AVA problem had now to be found. implication seemed obvious, though much would depend on the line taken by Mr Phan Hein when he arrived.
The
5. As the telegrams piled up and the less immediate aspects of the problem were discussed at considerable ? length in Geneva, Washington. Tokyo etc., it seemed only proper to emphasise the urgency of the problem and to suggest the drastic course of barging in on Ne Win and summarily asking for his personal help - and at no other level can one expect to cut Gordian knots in Burma. I could only wish that I had had more fer- tile suggestions to make (my telegram No.116).
6. Our best ally, quite unexpectedly, was Mr Phan Hein himself, I am still none too sure of what really took place (my telegram No.121); but the Foreign Minis- try assure me that he was quite firm that Vietnam did not wish the refugees to be returned, and that the
This may Burmese should get rid of them elsewhere. have much wider significance in view of the size of the problem with which you are dealing in other contexts.
7. I am greatly relieved that we have been spared the sort of experience I so vividly remember over the return of Russian D.P.s to their Soviet homeland in 1945. And I trust that your telegram No.581 to Hong Kong will have led to a satisfactory end to the story by the time this letter reaches you.
Yours
CONFIDENTIAL
2
Съешь?
TJ O'Brien