7.
CONFIDENTIAL
six of them suggests that the Americans, if
they wished, could decide whether to accept
refugees without their first being landed. The Canadians
too are considering whether they can take any of the
refugees without stipulating that they should be landed
in Hong Kong.
Arguments against letting the "Ava" sail (and in favour of the refugees being admitted to Hong Kong temporarily) are:
(i)
(ii)
that after the "Ava"'s experience, the masters of ships bound for Hong Kong will be unwilling to pick up refugees;
that the refugees should not leave Hong Kong without some assurance of their being admitted elsewhere;
(iii) that since the Americans have assumed the major responsibility for handling the problem of Vietnamese refugees and have more or less told us that they will take those on the "Ava" the chance of Hong Kong being left with the refugees
seems fairly remote;
(iv)
(v)
that it is difficult to continue to turn down the UNHCR's request, even though his office has not so far done much to help over the problem of the "Ava";
that, quite apart from adverse reactions from the Americans and the UNHCR (as well as British refugees organizations), a continuing refusal to admit the refugees would lead to criticism in Parliament; and
(vi) that if the refugees leave Hong Kong on the "Ava" there
remains the possibility that they might eventually be returned to Vietnam which, however unjustly, would be likely to expose us and the Hong Kong Government to serious
criticism.
Recommendation
8. The decision is a difficult one but I reluctantly conclude that we should ask Hong Kong to tell the master of the "Ava" that he may land the refugees after all. I submit a draft telegram accordingly. While this step will be unwelcome to Hong Kong, it will not I think come as a surprise.
9.
and NAD
UNDL
SEAD and UND, concur.
26 July 1976
Mellalk
PL O'Keeffe
4 CONFIDENTIAL
Hong Kong Department