c.c.
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2.
3.
I have pointed out to Browne that China and Japan are special problems. I have also made the point that it would be necessary to consider exactly what the person he had in nind would do and be able to achieve; the official services could not do firms' business for them and in the final analysis, what they could achieve depended almost entirely on the performance of British industry. Nevertheless, I agree with his point that we must retain the enthusiasm of the Hong Kong officials and that it would create the right impression here if there was someone at your end who worked full-time on Hong Kong. I cannot see BOTB agreeing to the precedent of a special unit for Hong Kong, however small, on the lines of the Export to Japan Unit which already must be something of an anomaly in an organisation structured on a commodity basis. I doubt that there is enough work for a full-time officer in CRE4, unless he fulfills a marketing function with the same terms of reference as the Japan Unit, namely "to alert British industry to the opportunities offered by the Hong Kong market". If he were to serve such a function he would have to travel extensively and make use of the BOTB services; and we would have to develop a close working relationship with him on a day to day basis. I doubt that it would be possible to justify such a post at present but, if the current exercise with the Hong Kong Government begins to generate a good deal of activity, the position may change. I hope that in any discussion with Browne you will at least keep the door open to this possibility.
4. Browne will wish to discuss this with you first and may also want to write to Sir Peter Thornton about it. I have suggested that he should talk to Sir Fred Catherwood and to Wilks in BOTB after seeing you as they will be able to give him a clearer picture than he has at present of the services provided by ESPB.
5. I am copying this letter to Stewart in HKIOD of the FCO, to whom I have already sent a copy of my letter to you of 26 November reporting the outcome of the first meeting. While your letter of 29 October to Lightman reporting the outcome of Sir Peter Thornton(s visit to Hong Kong was not copied to BOTB, they should know about the joint study being undertaken here in Hong Kong, particularly if Browne is to see Wilks and Sir Fred Catherwood about it.
day I leave it to you to see that they are informed at the appropriate level.
Mr.J.B.Stewart,
HKIOD,
FCO.
I.A.C. Kinnear
Senior British Trade Commissioner
P
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Joint Working Group on Trade with Britain
Minutes of the 1st Meeting held in
Economic Services Branch on 23rd November 1976
Present:
Chairman:
Members:
Secretary for Economic Services (The Hon. D.G. Jeaffreson).
Director of Commerce and Industry (The Hon. D.H. Jordan, CG, MBE, JP)
Mr. I.A.C. Kinnear, CIG
(Senior British Trade Commissioner in. H.K.')
Mr. L. Dunning, JP
(Executive Director, HK Trade
Development Council), ..
Mr. J.D. McGregor, OBE, ISO (Director, HKGCC)
In attendance:
Secretary:
Mr. R. Kilvert
d wie biro
(Acting Director of Government Supplies)
Mr. J.F.G. Marshall
Technical Secretary, PWD)
Mr. D.F.G. Farr
(British Trade Commission)
Mr. S.H. Leong
(Commercial Officer; BTC)
Assistant Secretary (Economic Services) 3 (Mrs. A. Kingston)
1/76 How the Working Group should proceed
7:
The Chairman proposed that the meeting should consider how
it should proceed in respect of the four tasks agreed at the preliminary meeting with the Financial Secretary, namely that the Working Group should aim
(a)
(b)
to comment on matters over which neither Government has any control (e.g. price, quality and delivery);
to see whether institutional arrangements over which
the respective Governments could exercise some influence
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2.
(c) to determine the extent to which fiscal developments in Britain are affecting British exports to H.K. (e.g. the consequences of the decline in value of the £)
(a) to determine ways in which the H.K. Government and
institutions can help the British Trade Commission.
As regards (a) matters over which neither Government had any control, Mr. Dunning reported that the T.D.C. had picked out certain products for which Britain's global export performance was good. It was examining Britain's exports to Hong Kong and Hong Kong's imports from all sources in these products. Mr. Dunning haped that this examination would show the extent to which, for example, price, quality and delivery had influenced Britain's sales in Hong Kong. The T.D. C. would be analysing Britain's - performance against the performance of other countries supplying to Hong Kong; it would also be looking to see why certain British firms appeared to do better in the Hong Kong market than their British competitors. ir. Kinnear advised that his Trade Commission would assist in the analysis from their knowledge of British companies.
3.
The meeting agreed that detailed analysis was to bo preferred to discussion of generalities. Members endorsed the Trade Development Council's approach and noted that the Trade Development Council would seek the assistance of the British Trade Commission as soon as they reached the analysis stage in respect of any particular product.
4.
As regards (b) institutional arrangements over which the
respective Governments could exercise some influence, Members noted Dritik
the general belief that British firms were often not well served by their agents in Hong Kong. They concluded that the exercise the Trade Development Council had initiated should enable the Working Group to compare the arrangements favoured by British firms with those used by their competitors.
5.
Members also noted the advantages Japanese suppliers had in encouraging their agents because of the proximity of Japan to Hong Kong. Nevertheless, there might be room to discount this
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agents?
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