CONFIDENTIAL
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5. The first reason for our having avoided public assertions of sovereignty over Hong Kong has evidently been concern for possible Chinese reactions. Certainly, in recent years, with the admission of the People's Republic of China to the UN and the improved climate of Anglo-Chinese relations, we have taken the view that we should, if at all possible, avoid giving offerce to the Chinese, by asserting our rights over Hong Kong. Thus Sir Colin Crowe's reply to the Chinese Permanent Representative's letter in 1972 was deliberately delayed in order to avoid any risk of spoiling the atmosphere for
Sir Alec Douglas-Home's visit to China in November 1972. Again, the brief for the Chinese Foreign Minister's visit to London in June 1973 advised that if Mr Chi P'eng-fei made any remarks prejudicial to our view of the status of Hong Kong, the Secretary of State should in that case (but only in that case) put the record straight. In doing so, Sir Alec Douglas-Home was strongly recommended to confine himself to making the following points:-
"(1) If the Chinese continue to assert their view
(2)
of the status of Hong Kong, they should be
in no doubt that we may be forced to assert our view of Hong Kong's status in reply.
We shall continue to act in Hong Kong and over the affairs of Hong Kong in accordance with our
view of Hong Kong's status and our responsibility for its administration."
It will be noted that, once again, only a statement implying sovereignty was envisaged.
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The second explanation is that we have had doubts about the wisdom of retaining sovereignty over Hong Kong and as to whether
'sovereignty" has been the correct term to use with regard to the New Territories of Hong Kong since these were territories acquired by lease. After the Second World War, both Mr Churchill and Mr Attlee made it clear that they did not wish to give up Hong Kong and in August 1945, with the defeat of Japan, the newly
/re-established
CONFIDENTIAL