CONFIDENTIAL
IV.
SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS:
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(More detailed recommendations, covering action during the Secretary of State's visit, are contained in a note by Far Eastern Department at Annex C.)
Common Interests
29. In summary, China is a vast country but one which is not yet playing a very active role in world economic affairs. She offers some trade prospects and individual contracts may be very large. There are important differences between the Chinese and British views of the world, but in certain key areas our national interests are at worst complementary and at best very similar; in practice, for some time to come, our interests will probably rarely clash, and not over major issues except possibly Hong Kong. At least so long as we seek a better relation- ship with Moscow we have a degree of interest in the Sino-Soviet split not developing much further; an improvement in relations between Peking and Moscow could in theory make it easier for us to deal with each without offending the other. Nevertheless, the Western interest would not on balance be served by any extensive rapprochement. In practice, despite détente, the policies and potential of the Soviet Union are likely to menace the peace in Europe and elsewhere for many years to come. We can, therefore, afford to be robust in telling the Russians that cur policies towards China are our business. By the same token, Soviet policies towards China are likely to appear sufficiently menacing for any Chinese Government, even one on better terms with Moscow, to be very wary about reducing its defence effort against the Soviet threat. We might therefore earn both money and goodwill by selling the Chinese increasingly sophisticated military equipment and by helping them to identify ways in which their defences against the Soviet Union might be strengthened. This suggests a progressive easing of COCOM restrictions and a common European line on the sale of sensitive equipment to China.
Defence Sales
30. There are several difficulties. Defence equipment could be deployed against other Asian states, including those where we have a substantial stake; the Japanese might feel threatened by it; the Americans, whose interests are more directly involved in the area than our own, might be worried about its effect on South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippinnes in particular. We might equally incur criticism from fellow members of the Commonwealth, such as India, though we could contain this.
31.
However, certa in non-strategic weapons and equipment (Spey aero engines and sophisticated radar are cases in point) may increase China's deterrent strength and even have a stabilizing effect, while not noticeably increasing her offensive capacity. Many items of weapons or equipment which come into this category are at present subject to the strategic embargo and there is a strong case for re-examining the relevance of COCOM to China's present circumstances.
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CONFIDENTIAL