CONFIDENTIAL
21. Aggressive Chinese policies towards Taiwan might adversely affect relations with Japan. However, so long as China places high priority on good relations with the US and the latter have a treaty obligation to Taiwan the Chinese are unlikely to take active steps to further their claim, although this could change if Taiwan looked like developing a nuclear weapons capability. Neither such a development nor a pre-emptive strike by Peking would be in the Western interest. Equally any move by the West which enhanced Taiwan's political status would be strongly resented in Peking.
China and Africa
22. In 1963 Chou En-lai pronounced Africa "ripe for revolution". At least by Chinese standards of revolution, his prophecy has hardly been fulfilled. Nowadays, the prime concern of the Chinese in Africa, as elsewhere, is to counter Soviet influence. They have invested a good deal in Tanzania and have run training camps there; but their general role has been more unobtrusive than that of their Soviet rivals. Although eclipsed by the Russians in Angola, they have so far shown no sign of stepping up their own African activities in consequence. They lack comparable resources, or may prefer to play the game more slowly. But any attempt to undermine their position in Eastern Africa would meet with a more determined response.
III
FUTURE PROSPECTS
The Leadership
23. Because our knowledge of the Chinese leadership is limited, confident predictions cannot be made about the policies of those who will succeed Mao and Chou. But whatever leadership emerges must remain primarily concerned with China's economic problems and is most likely therefore to continue following more or less pragmatic policies, though with periods of radicalism and confusion from time to time.
External Relations
24.
In foreign affairs, there is little doubt that any Chinese leadership will be robustly patriotic in defending China's frontiers and immediate interests. Relations with the Soviet Union will remain of central importance. It is not of course certain that all potential leaders of China would regard hostility towards the Soviet Union and warmer relations with the West as the best means of achieving their ends. Sino-Soviet relations could continue at arms length, as now; they are unlikely to become significantly worse; and they could improve. But there is little reason to expect that, even if there were a measure of Sino-Soviet rapprochement, it would result in significant policy changes. China's trade policies are likely to continue to be dictated by the needs of economic develop- ment. The Russians might pull back or even re-deploy their troops in Asia, but they could never feel totally secure; they would be unlikely to disband significant numbers and would destroy no equipment. In third countries, there might be less animosity between pro-Peking and pro-Moscow Communists; but the two theoretical approaches to the development of a Marxist utopia would continue to attract their own adherents. The Communist world is likely to continue to have its Rome and Byzantium.
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CONFIDENTIAL