extent the preparations got out of phase because of the misunderstanding over the PUS's request to the Governor for a second Despatch; and by the uncertainties following Mr Wilson's decision to retire. Nothing is, however, lost and indeed there may well be something to be said for considering these matters over a slightly longer period.
8. It would be wrong to leave the Governor with the impression that the delay can be for very long. The TUC International Committee have already raised the Hong Kong issue with the new Secretary of State in the course of his meeting with them shortly after assuming office and there have already been warning shots from the NEC. The pressures are unlikely to be less on Mr Crosland than they were on fir Callaghan; and, by temperament, he is unlikely to take a different view. Indeed, Mr Callaghan, as Prime Minister, will find himself subject to a good deal of pressure from domestic interests on various Hong Kong issues.
9. The next stage in consideration of the problem is the Governor's proposed visit to London. This will give a good opportunity for the new Secretary of State to focus on the issues and take up matters thereafter as Mr Callaghan was expected to do after his visit to Hong Kong. For these reasons we would greatly welcome a continuation of the dialogue by correspondence bearing in mind the above considerations. We would aim to put before the new Decretary of State an outline of the problems, fully taking into account the Governor's views.
10. We are all well aware of the pressures on the Governor both in explaining British political realities in llong Kong, and Hong Kong practical realities in London. The paper tries to suggest a way of lessening the pressures on the Governor by a more continuous dialogue over a wider range with the Governor's more senior advisers. We would particularly welcome
his comments on this point.
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