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llor, surely, is the danger from a u.d.i. supported by the communists. Because of the PRC attitude this could only be an indigenous movement towards some kind of union with China: this is what we want.
Is not the danger really of the emergence of a llong Kong identity among the broad mass of the population coupled with a demand for an independent Hong Kong? And it should be remembered that the political realities may not be as fully understood among the middle classes, particularly the younger generation, as it is among those closer to big business and the Government. To some extend the llong Kong identity is already appearing, as a generation born in Hong Kong, and knowing only Hong Kong, grows up. If this moved towards demands for independence there could only be one result. A forcible take-over by China of an unwilling Hong Kong: the worst possible result for the UK, producing the maximum number of refugees.
I believe that the most likely policy to lead to demands for greater and greater independence is one which will produce a confrontation between more representative Hong Kong institutions and a UK, intent on forcing economic and social reform in Hong Kong. In other words our present policy. Indeed even if we abandoned our attempts to bring about social and economic reform, more representative institutions will still have a tendency, as they always do in dependent territories, to produce a movement towards greater independence. But in my view, though the people of llong Kong may not realise it, we need economic and social reform in Hong Kong as an insurance against the approach to the 1997 cut off date. This is undoubtedly arrogant, but it may be that it is something which can be seen better at a distance. Without an adequate social security and welfare network Hong Kong will inevitably get into difficulties as the economy begins to run down, possibly in the 00s and certainly the 90s. Therefore we
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/cannot