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6.
The longer term prospect, therefore, is for the moderate line to prevail. But first, if disruption or administrative paralysis is to be avoided, a series of compromises will have to be made whereby the many posts left vacant by the passing of Mao and others in the past 18 months or so are distributed among the factions (the position of Chairman of the Party may be left unfilled as a tribute to Mao). In such an atmosphere, major policy changes are unlikely. The debate about the speed at which modernisation is to be achieved, and the means to achieve it, will doubtless continue, and will probably be centred around the issues of wage differentials and incentives in industry, the scale of collectivisation in agriculture, Red v Expert, and the extent of reliance on foreign technology. Radical criticism of the pragmatic Teng line can be expected to persist; whilst moderate attacks on the more extreme policies which evolved from the Cultural Revolution, such as the sending of youths to the countryside, and the politicisation of the universities may be a possibility in due course.
7.
Preoccupation with intemal matters may leave China's leaders with less time for foreign policy which is likely to continue on the same lines as before, ie support for the Third World, friendship towards the West, gradual normalisation of relations with the US and hostility towards the Soviet Union. Mao's death has in theory removed a major obstacle to improved relations with the Russians, but the dispute is deeply engrained and any change which eventually occurs would probably involve only a slight improvement in State, rather than Party, relations. But ideological differences would severely restrict the process unless a leadership emerged in China which effectively rejected all that Mao ever stood for. The Soviet leadership is doubtless resigned to China's continuing hostility, though it may entertain hopes for an eventual improvement. This could explain the rather curious decision to send a Party to Party message of condolence on Mao's death, a gesture more surprising than Peking's rejection of it on the grounds that inter-Party relations do not exist. There are also signs of a slight softening of the anti- Chinese line in the Soviet press and some articles have recalled earlier periods of Sino Soviet friendship. Gromyko, in his speech at the UN Assembly, said that the USSR "continues to attach great importance" to relations with China, and that their "normalisation would have a positive impact on the situation in Asia
A major article on Sino-Soviet relations in Pravda on 1 October was conciliatory in tone, reiterating that the Soviet Union wanted normalisation of relations and cataloguing past Soviet initiatives to that end. It omitted the usual explicit criticism of Maoism. A Soviet government message of greetings to China on 1 October to mark their national day was also slightly warmer in tone. These are no doubt intended as signals of willingness to improve relations should the Chinese leaders themselves agree to do so. They may also be intended as attempts to drive wedges between the Chinese leadership and to encourage any (as yet unidentified) pro-Soviet elements in Peking. At the same time it doubtless suits Soviet purposes to be able to demonstrate that they alone are making genuine efforts to end the quarrel.
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